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DEMOCRACY ENHANCEMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Janet Moore*
There is a democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and
poverty. The causes and consequences of hyperincarceration
disproportionately affect those least likely to mount an effective
oppositional politics: poor people and people of color. This Article
breaks new ground by arguing that the democracy deficit calls for a
democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure that
modifies traditional justifications of retributivism and deterrence by
prioritizing self-governance. Part I contextualizes the argument within
cyclical retrenchments in movements for racial and economic justice.
Part II sketches the contours of a democracy-enhancing theory. Parts III
and IV turn that theoretical lens on a single jurisdiction, North Carolina,
to map a previously unnoticed constellation of cutting-edge criminal
justice reforms. Part III explains why those reforms were improbable.
Part IV tests the democracy-enhancing effect of the reforms. Part V
identifies some conditions that allowed reform to occur and occasionally
survive counterattack. The Article concludes that those conditions
privilege grasstops over grassroots advocacy, and highlights examples of
direct action by low-income people and people of color as a vital
component of a more broadly democratic foundation for criminal law
and procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
In late October 2010, Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe landed his private
plane on a closed runway at a small airport in south Texas. He did not notice the
“giant yellow X,” the repair trucks, or the fleeing workers “until it was too late to
safely abort the landing.” 1 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sanctioned
the senator by ordering him to take remedial flying lessons. 2 He shot back with
Senate Bill 1335, “The Pilot’s Bill of Rights.” 3
Inhofe sought to check the government’s “power to take action against an
individual.” 4 He explained that he never fully appreciated “the feeling of
desperation” that adverse government action can inspire “until it happened to
me.” 5 He was troubled that “pilots sometimes aren’t given access to all the
evidence that might help their case.” 6 He was shocked that “it took me, a U.S.
senator, four months to get the voice recording to prove I was right” in defending
against the FAA’s accusations. 7
Sixty-four cosponsoring senators quickly backed Inhofe’s bill, 8 as did
organizations comprising more than half a million “single-issue people who fly
airplanes.” 9 Even Indiana Jones joined the fight. Lobbying on this “real justice
issue,” actor Harrison Ford decried agency treatment of private pilots as the sole
exception to “the standard that we face everywhere else for justice.” 10
The Pilot’s Bill of Rights cures that injustice by requiring the FAA to release
“all relevant evidence” to a targeted pilot before proceeding with any enforcement
action. 11 The bill became law just thirteen months after Inhofe introduced
1

Joan Lowy, Inhofe Targets FAA After His Flying Is Faulted, WASH. TIMES (July 10,
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/10/inhofe-targets-faa-after-his-flyi
ng-is-faulted/?page=all.
2
Id.
3
S. 1335, 112th Cong. §§ 1–5 (2011) (enacted). For a detailed legislative history, see
S. 1335 (112th): Pilot’s Bill of Rights, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1335
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
4
Lowy, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Chris Casteel, Oklahoma Sen. Jim Inhofe Scores Legislative Victory With Pilots’
Rights Bill, OKLAHOMAN (July 2, 2012), http://newsok.com/controversial-landing-leads-toinhofe-bill-on-pilot-rights/article/3689518 (subscription required).
8
S. 1335 (112th): Pilot’s Bill of Rights, supra note 3.
9
Lowy, supra note 1.
10
Ford’s remarks are reported on Senator Inhofe’s website. Actor, Pilot Harrison
Ford Endorses Inhofe’s Pilot Bill of Rights, JAMES M. INHOFE (Oct. 20, 2011), http://inhofe
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=
221db5bb-99b7-a687-ba91-52914db0c3c9.
11
Id. The bill mandates that the FAA release data, including investigative reports,
“that would facilitate the individual’s ability to productively participate in the
investigation” of any alleged infraction that could affect his or her certification. Pilot’s Bill
of Rights, S. 1335, 112th Cong. § 2(b)(4). The FAA must disclose such information to the
targeted individual at least thirty days before ruling on the alleged infraction. Id. § 2(b)(5).
To address Inhofe’s concern that appeals of FAA decisions to the National Transportation
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it. 12 Thus proceeded the campaign to open the black box—not the flight recorder
that explains pilot error or equipment malfunction, but its cognate, the
investigative file that can help a pilot defend against agency allegations of
wrongdoing.
John Thompson shares Inhofe’s interest in checking government power over
the individual—and in ensuring accuracy and reliability in adjudications—by
mandating enforceable governmental discovery duties.13 Thompson was not
ordered to take remedial flying lessons. He was sentenced to death. For fourteen of
the eighteen years that he was incarcerated, Thompson spent twenty-three hours a
day in solitary confinement in a windowless six-by-nine-foot cell. 14 A few weeks
before his final execution date, a last-ditch investigation unearthed a microfiche
copy of a laboratory report never previously disclosed by prosecutors or law
enforcement. 15 The exculpatory evidence in that report eventually led to
Thompson’s release. 16
Despite their differences, the cases of Thompson and Inhofe share a salient
theme. They raise concerns about the unfairness and inefficiency caused when
government agents do not reveal information that is beneficial to the defense. In
criminal cases like Thompson’s, such discovery obligations are imposed by Brady
v. Maryland 17 and related cases, criminal discovery rules, and codes of
professional ethics. 18 But two recent Supreme Court cases seriously undermined
the already weak enforceability of those discovery duties. 19 In Thompson’s case,
five justices gave a wink and nod to Brady violations; the Court vacated
Thompson’s $14,000,000 damages award despite prosecutors’ conceded violation
of their due process discovery duties. 20 The same majority told prosecutors who
comply with Brady that they can be damned if they do; the First Amendment could
not shield prosecutor Richard Ceballos from his supervisors’ retaliation when he
brought Brady information to light. 21
No single-issue lobby, group of legislators, or movie star reacted to the
experiences of Thompson or Ceballos by demanding nationally applicable,
mandatory criminal discovery reform along the lines of Inhofe’s Bill of Rights for
private pilots. 22 And when a few U.S. senators recently sought criminal discovery
Safety Board are simply “rubber stamps,” Lowy, supra note 1, the Pilot’s Bill of Rights
expands appeal rights and reduces deference to FAA rulings. See S. 1335, § 2(d)–(e).
12
See Pilot’s Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 112-153, 126 Stat. 1159 (2012) (to be
codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44101, 44701, 44703, 44710 (2012)); Casteel, supra note 7;
S.1335—Pilot’s Bill of Rights, supra note 3.
13
See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1330–31 (2012).
14
Id. at 1348.
15
Id. at 1348–49.
16
Id.
17
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
18
Moore, supra note 13, at 1329–30.
19
Id. at 1353–54, 1365–66.
20
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011).
21
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
22
Moore, supra note 13, at 1377 & n.345 (discussing the death, by the secret vote of a
single senator, of federal whistle-blower legislation designed in part to protect prosecutors
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reform, their proposal fell far short of the expansive provisions in the Pilot’s Bill of
Rights.
The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012 23 responded to highly
publicized Brady violations that occurred during the federal prosecution of former
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens. 24 Stevens’s colleague from Alaska, Senator Lisa
Murkowski, proposed the Act. Where Inhofe had dozens of senatorial cosponsors
for his reform bill, Murkowski had five. 25 Where a half-million single-issue voters
backed the Pilot’s Bill of Rights, a whopping 143 lawyers, law enforcement
officers, and jurists gave their joint public imprimatur to the Fairness in Disclosure
Act. 26 Murkowski’s Act, while improving on Brady, also would have required far
narrower disclosure than the Pilot’s Bill of Rights. 27 Nevertheless, after a single
hearing, the Act died in committee. 28
Murkowski’s Act also did not begin to approach existing state models for
broad criminal discovery. For example, North Carolina pioneered the nation’s only
mandatory, statewide, full open-file reform model. 29 Those statutes mandate
who strive to comply with discovery duties); see also John Thompson, Op-Ed., The
Prosecution Rests, But I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
04/10/opinion/10thompson.html?pagewanted=all (describing Connick and its aftermath).
23
S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
24
In re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2012). A 500-page
investigative report found that Stevens’s prosecution was “permeated by the systematic
concealment of significant exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 235. But the judge accepted the
special investigator’s decision not to recommend contempt proceedings. Id. at 244. On the
lack of sanctions for Brady violations, see, for example, Moore, supra note 13, at 1341–71.
25
S. 2197—Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, OPEN CONGRESS, http://
www.opencongress.org/bill/112-s2197/show (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
26
See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, A Call for Congress to Reform Federal Criminal
Discovery (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/1
0/callforcriminaldiscoveryreform.pdf. This “Call for Congress” issued the same day that
Senator Murkowski introduced her bill, see S. 2197, supra note 25, which was also the
same day the special prosecutors’ 500-page report was made available to the public. 842 F.
Supp. 2d at 257. For the special prosecutor’s full report, see Report to Hon. Emmet G.
Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s Order, Dated April 7, 2009, In
re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 08-242 (RWR)),
available at http://www.wc.com/assets/attachments/Schuelke%20Report.pdf.
27
As discussed in Moore, supra note 13, at 1339–41, Brady’s materiality-prejudice
test hamstrings the doctrine’s enforceability by requiring proof that disclosure of
exculpatory or impeachment information would have created a reasonable possibility of a
different outcome. The federal Fairness in Disclosure Act would have significantly
strengthened discovery duties by defining them more broadly and by shifting the burden of
proof, requiring prosecutors to prove that nondisclosure of information that “may
reasonably appear to be favorable” to the defendant was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. S. 2197, 112th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), (h) (2012). The Act also improves upon Brady by
requiring disclosure “before the entry of any guilty plea.” Id. § 2(c)(1). See Moore, supra
note 13, at 1343–46 (discussing doctrine limiting Brady disclosure duties to trial).
28
S. 2197 (112th): Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197 (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
29
Moore, supra note 13, at 1380–86 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903 to -910
(2012)).
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disclosure to the defense of all information obtained in the state’s investigation of a
criminal case. 30 They require recordation of oral statements 31 that are critical for
impeaching prosecution witnesses, 32 evaluating and negotiating plea offers, and
counseling defendants on whether to testify. 33 Willful violators of these discovery
statutes face criminal penalties. 34
Several factors drive the wide variance in discovery duties that government
actors owe an accused. A federal regulatory action against a private pilot raises
very different concerns than those at issue in a criminal prosecution. The civil
rights claims raised by Thompson and Ceballos under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also raised
distinctive stakes in the contest between federal deference to local authority on one
hand and the vindication of federal constitutional rights on the other. 35
But the magnitude of the respective threats by the FAA and federal
prosecutors to the interests of Inhofe and Stevens is minuscule compared with the
very nearly successful attempt of New Orleans prosecutors to “fry” Thompson, a
young, low-income African American man accused of murdering the wealthy
white son of a prominent local businessman. 36 The disparate responses to these
cases might be dismissed as illustrating a political principle so basic as to be banal:
Them as has, gets. Sharp systemic disparities enhance (for some) and hinder (for
others) access to the political influence necessary to drive change. Inhofe occupies
one end of the spectrum. His speed and strength in manipulating the levers of
power appear steroid enhanced.
Thompson’s case arose at the other end of the spectrum—amid the democracy
deficit at an intersection of crime, race, and poverty. 37 That intersection is
30

Id. at 1332–33 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2012)).
Id. (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(c) (2012)).
32
See R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1430–31 (2011).
33
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND
TRIAL BY JURY 1–2 (3d ed. 1996).
34
Moore, supra note 13, at 1332–33 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d)).
35
See, e.g., Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State
Constitutions Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies
Jurisprudence, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 877, 889–97 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court
justifications for limiting availability of civil rights remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
36
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356, 1373 n.7, 1373–74 (2011) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in upholding Thompson’s
multimillion-dollar jury verdict, such elevated victim status tends to “receive[] a lot of
attention.” Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 843 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 578
F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (equally divided decision), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(2011). Empirical research reveals that victim status, including racial or ethnic identity, is a
significant contributor to outcome severity in criminal cases. Cassia Spohn, Thirty Years of
Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUST.
427, 428 (2000).
37
These terms are not reified. Of the abundant literature on the socially constructed
meanings of “crime,” “race,” and “poverty” respectively, see, for example, MATTHEW D.
ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 326–37
(2012) (discussing relative definitions of poverty and building upon concepts of
comparative fairness and well-being articulated in THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND
PARTIALITY 64–68 (1991) and Larry S. Temkin, Equality, Priority, or What?, 19 ECON. &
31
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structured by concentrated disadvantage. 38 The multidimensional and recalcitrant
resource disparities that, in some sense, serve as the foundation upon which
criminal justice systems rest 39 also raise hurdles to creating and maintaining
coalitions across lines of race and class. 40 Crime, hyperincarceration, 41 and their
causes and consequences are felt most directly and disproportionately by those
least likely to mount effective oppositional politics and oversee the formation and
implementation of criminal law and procedure—poor people and people of color. 42
PHIL. 61, 70–71 (2003)); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 3–8 (1993) (“[C]rime . . . is a slippery, variable, protean concept. . . .”); KAREN F.
PARKER, UNEQUAL CRIME DECLINE: THEORIZING RACE, URBAN INEQUALITY, AND
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 6–7 (2008) (expressing “amaze[ment] to find that scholars disagreed
entirely on the meaning of the term [race]”); Marjorie S. Zatz & Nancy Rodriguez,
Conceptualizing Race and Ethnicity in Studies of Crime and Criminal Justice, in THE
MANY COLORS OF CRIME 39, 39–40 (Ruth D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006) (noting that “race,
ethnicity, gender, and class . . . do not have any inherent, absolute meaning” external to
their social construction).
38
See, e.g., Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors
and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 378–79 (2005) (“[T]he
strongest and most stable macro-level predictors of crime include racial heterogeneity . . .
poverty, and family disruption—factors typically treated as indicators of ‘concentrated
disadvantage.’”); Robert J. Sampson & Lydia Bean, Cultural Mechanisms and Killing
Fields: A Revised Theory of Community-Level Racial Inequality, in THE MANY COLORS OF
CRIME, supra note 37, at 8, 11 (“It is unambiguously the case in meta-analysis[] . . . that
concentrated neighborhood disadvantage is the largest and most consistent predictor of
violence across studies.”).
39
See, e.g., United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 628–45, 670–88
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing factors affecting defendants’ lives, choices, and probabilities
of successful reentry into society after imprisonment, such as segregated housing;
inadequate schooling; unmet physical and mental health needs; and missing, dysfunctional,
and violent family relationships).
40
See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in THE LEGAL STUDIES READER: A
CONVERSATION & READINGS ABOUT THE LAW 250, 253 (George Wright & Maria Stalzer
Wyant Cuzzo eds., 2004) (contending that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in
this country” due to adaptability of white dominance but that resistance “itself has meaning
and should give us hope for the future”); Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing:
Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 248, 250–52 (2012)
(critiquing Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw. U. L. REV.
149 (2011), for failure to distinguish Bell’s interest-convergence and racial realism
theories).
41
Loïc Wacquant correctly rejects the term “mass incarceration.” It is precisely
because unprecedented incarceration rates disproportionately affect low-income people and
people of color while leaving the majority either unscathed or in some respect well served
that those rates are less readily remedied through the democratic process. Loïc Wacquant,
Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139 DAEDALUS 74, 74, 78–79
(2010).
42
See, e.g., ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1980–2008: ANNUAL RATES
FOR 2009 AND 2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008
.pdf (discussing disproportionate homicide victimization of minority individuals); ERIKA
HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BLACK VICTIMS OF
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For some, the democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty
supports skepticism if not despair toward litigation, legislation, and activism as
avenues toward sustainable reform. 43 But disparity need not breed despairity. 44
This Article argues that the democracy deficit calls for a democracy-enhancing
theory of criminal law and procedure, which refocuses the traditional justifications
of retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation by prioritizing self-governance.
More specifically, this approach prioritizes direct participation by poor people
and people of color, not only in the formation and oversight of what are too often
perceived as criminal injustice systems, but also in reversing criminogenic policies
that rely on those systems as mechanisms of social control. Thus, a democracyenhancing emphasis holds intrinsic value as well as promise for improving crime
prevention, system legitimacy, and case outcomes.
The argument unfolds in five parts. Part I contextualizes the despairity
narrative in criminal law and procedure within a broader and cyclical retrenchment
across movements for racial and economic justice. Part II explains the attraction of
a democracy enhancement theory and sketches its contours. Parts III and IV train
this roughly honed theoretical lens on North Carolina’s previously unmapped
cluster of pioneering criminal justice reforms.
Part III examines the regressive socioeconomic and political state history that
made these reforms unlikely. Part IV describes the reforms and assesses their
democracy-enhancing potential. While each helps to level power disparities, two
pack significant punch. First, evidence-based early intervention programs, such as
Nurse-Family Partnerships, build capacities for resilience and self-governance
while costing pennies on the dollar vis-à-vis investment in criminal justice
apparatuses. At the opposite, most resource-intensive end of the criminal justice
spectrum, North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act vindicated the dignitary interests
and participatory rights of diverse decision makers in capital juries by redressing
racial bias in the exercise of peremptory strikes.
Part V acknowledges that, just as motives for North Carolina’s constellation
of criminal justice reforms have been mixed, so too their effectiveness and abilities
VIOLENT CRIME 1–3, 5, tbl.5 (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/bvvc
.pdf (discussing disproportionate violent crime victimization of African Americans); Erica
J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 32–33 (2011) (noting
overrepresentation of low-income people in criminal justice systems and calling for more
data collection); Toya Z. Like & Jody Miller, Race, Inequality, and Gender Violence: A
Contextual Examination, in THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME, supra note 37, at 157, 158
(noting adolescent African American girls are at even higher risk of nonstranger violence
than their male cohorts). For a brief introduction to the effects of conscious and
unconscious racial biases in criminal justice systems, see Janet Moore, Causes,
Consequences and Cures of Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in Conviction and
Incarceration Rates: An Introduction, 3 FREEDOM CENTER J. 35 (2011).
43
See infra Part I.B.
44
See infra Part I (defining “despairity” as “the tendency to despair of litigation and
legislation as avenues to reform given demographic disparities in access to those levers of
power”). See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES xv, 156–69 (2008) (noting but contesting
the “general[] and depressing” scholarly agreement that globalization of the United States’
distinctively punitive “penal populism” is inevitable).
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to survive reaction and repeal. 45 This Part interrogates the conditions that allowed
these reforms to occur and occasionally to survive counterattack. Distinguishing
characteristics include institutionalized capacities for critical reflection and
collaboration on hot-button criminal justice issues. Oppositional politics also play
a role. They are informed by a relatively robust and proactive indigent defense
function and diverse mechanisms for the collection, assessment, and strategic use
of criminal justice data.
The Article concludes that those conditions privilege advocacy by elites, and
highlights examples of direct action by low-income people and people of color as a
vital component of a more broadly democratic foundation for criminal law and
procedure and, ultimately, of any sustainable turn away from criminogenic policies
that feed the carceral state.
I. DESPAIRITY IN CONTEXT
This Part identifies the despairity narrative in criminal law and procedure as a
tendency to despair of litigation and legislation as avenues to reform given
demographic disparities in access to those levers of power. This Part also
contextualizes the despairity narrative within a broader and cyclical retrenchment
across movements for racial and economic justice. Part I.A discusses sources of the
democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. Part I.B focuses
on the despairity motif among criminal justice scholars. Part I.C situates that motif
amidst an old and ongoing struggle to fulfill what historian John Hope Franklin
described as this country’s broken “promise of real equality.” 46
A. Human Beings and Citizens: Sources of the Democracy Deficit
In October 2010, as Inhofe was landing his plane in south Texas; as attorneys
were preparing to argue Thompson’s case before the Supreme Court; and as
special prosecutors were investigating government suppression of exculpatory
evidence in Stevens’s case, eleven men from a Brooklyn housing project were
hammering out plea deals on federal drug and weapons charges. United States v.
Bannister 47 discusses the outcome in these cases. For several reasons, Bannister
provides a distinctive window into the sources of the democracy deficit that
contributed to the disparate long-term outcomes in the Inhofe, Thompson, and
Stevens cases.
First, Bannister’s opening lines transform a mine-run federal sentencing
decision into a cri de coeur over lives impaled at the intersection of crime, race,
and poverty. The judiciary is generally disinclined to detail the recalcitrant links
between racial and class disparities in rates of undereducation, unemployment,
45

Cf. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 153 (1961) (“[N]o sane person
ever believed in a kind of progress which advanced in an unbroken straight line without
reverses and deviations and breaks in continuity so that even the sharpest reverse is not
necessarily fatal to the belief.”).
46
John Hope Franklin, Foreword, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED xi–xii (David S.
Cecelski & Timothy B. Tyson eds., 1998).
47
786 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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poverty, substance abuse and addiction, family instability, and violence on one
hand and criminal victimization, offending, incarceration, and recidivism on the
other. 48 Bannister comprises more than seventy pages of historical, legal, and
socioeconomic analysis on those issues. That analysis was informed by the highly
unusual personal visit of a presiding judge to the neighborhood in which the
defendants lived and committed their crimes. 49
The opinion’s findings and conclusions are also noteworthy. The court found
“substantial evidence” that mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine
charges are the unconstitutional result of racial prejudice.50 The court further
concluded that factors shaping defendants’ lives and opportunities rendered several
of the mandatory minimum prison sentences excessive. 51 Finally, the court
acknowledged the improbability that scarce public funds would support the
rehabilitation programs required by the sentencing order or that the defendants’
imprisonment would yield any positive outcome whatsoever. To the contrary, the
court observed that the defendants were likely condemned upon completion of
their sentences to lives in “a permanent underclass with almost no opportunity to
achieve economic stability, let alone the American dream of upward mobility.” 52
The opinion’s final lines are circumspect. The court insists that while the
defendants
are hemmed in by circumstances, the law must believe that free will
offers an escape. Otherwise, its vaunted belief in redemption and
deterrence—both specific and general—is a euphemism for cruelty.
These defendants are not merely criminals, but human beings and fellow
American citizens, deserving of an opportunity for rehabilitation. Even
now, they are capable of useful lives, lived lawfully. 53
Bannister’s parting words embody the court’s relentlessly grim inability to
match the defendants’ capacities for “useful lives, lived lawfully” with even a
remote likelihood that opportunities for rehabilitation will find any actualization.
The court’s need to expressly affirm not only the defendants’ citizenship but also
their humanity speaks volumes about their exclusion from approved structures of
48
But see Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that 70% of defendants represented by appointed counsel plead guilty; 70% of
those plea-convicted defendants serve time in jail or prison; and nearly 70% of incarcerated
inmates failed to graduate high school and are in the lowest two of five literacy levels—and
therefore unable, for example, to “use a bus schedule”). Public defense cases also
disproportionately involve defendants suffering from mental illness. See NAT’L RIGHT TO
COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 75 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE
DENIED], available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf.
49
Tom Hays, Veteran Federal Judge Visits Drug Gang’s NYC Turf, USA TODAY
(Mar. 5, 2011, 1:30 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-03-05-310
3728283_x.htm.
50
Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 666–67.
51
Id. at 670, 674, 680–88.
52
Id. at 689.
53
Id. at 690.
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self-governance, their deviance from a norm so elusive as to approach the
chimerical. 54
B. From Disparity to Despairity
Bannister adds an important chapter to a massive literature on the racialized,
politicized, and industrialized criminal justice policies in the United States; their
contribution to unprecedented levels of incarceration; and the harsh effects on the
low-income and minority individuals who disproportionately encounter criminal
justice systems—often with multiple identities of victim, accused defendant, actual
perpetrator, and witness. 55 That literature has been decades in the making. More
than a century ago, W.E.B. DuBois exposed the incommensurably low rates of
education and employment and inversely high rates of criminal justice involvement
for urban African American males. 56 In the same era, Ida B. Wells barely escaped
lynching during a career dedicated to identifying and challenging structural forms
of repressive violence manifest not only in extralegal executions but also in convict
leasing—two social control mechanisms that systematically resoldered well-forged
links between crime, class, and color. 57
Of course, historical comparisons must be approached with caution. 58 As
Marie Gottschalk notes, “[T]he creation of the carceral state was more subtle and
complex than just drawing a straight line from the plantation to Jim Crow to the
ghetto to the prison-industrial complex today.” 59 Whether the democracy deficit at
the intransigent intersection of race, class, and crime is described in terms of the
New Jim Crow 60 or hyperincarceration, 61 the upshot is the same. As illustrated
54

See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 27–35, 116–18 (contrasting exclusionary and
degrading criminal justice systems with inclusionary and rehabilitative systems). On the
psychosocial need to define and exclude an “Other,” see, for example, JULIA KRISTEVA,
POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 65–66 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., 1982)
(noting various rites, the intentions of which are “to separate this or that social, sexual, or
age group from another one”); Sampson & Bean, supra note 38, at 26–27 (discussing
“symbolic violence” through which “people try[] to establish a worthy identity by drawing
symbolic boundaries” between themselves and lower-caste Others).
55
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56
W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY 83–99,
235–58 (Benjamin Blom, Inc. 1967) (1899).
57
See ANGELA D. SIMS, ETHICAL COMPLICATIONS OF LYNCHING: IDA B. WELLS’S
INTERROGATION OF AMERICAN TERROR 45–61 (2010); IDA WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE:
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 61–63 (1970).
58
See, e.g., CARR, supra note 45, at 34–35 (“[T]he historian is engaged on a
continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his
facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other.”).
59
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 263 (2006).
60
See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New
Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 25–27 (2012); David Jacobs & Aubrey L. Jackson, On
the Politics of Imprisonment: A Review of Systematic Findings, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
129, 146 (2010) (concluding that law-and-order campaigns combined with an emphasis on
the linkage between race and street crime provide a plausible explanation for the rapid
increase in U.S. imprisonment rates); Victor R. Thompson & Lawrence D. Bobo, Thinking
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below, the United States’ myriad local, state, and federal criminal justice systems
impose incarceration levels and lengths that are nearly unparalleled around the
globe. 62
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These practices impose astounding costs in tax dollars and wasted lives. With
a few important exceptions, 63 the literature that documents these phenomena

About Crime: Race and Lay Accounts of Lawbreaking Behavior, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 16, 21–24 (2011) (discussing racial variance in individual-personal versus
social-structural explanations for criminal offending). See generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (comparing mass incarceration today to Jim Crow laws of the
past); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007)
(discussing the war on crime and its effects on legislative and judicial decisions, family and
social interactions, public schools, and employment); AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE,
DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008)
(discussing the war on crime and its history, consequences, and potential solutions).
61
See Wacquant, supra note 41, at 78–80.
62
See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 140 fig.14; Roy Walmsley, World Prison
Population List, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES 2–6 & tbls.1–5 (2013), http://www.
prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf (providing
data); CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN
A GLOBAL CONTEXT 15–46 (2012), www.usfca.edu/law/docs/criminalsentencing (same).
63
See Forman, supra note 60, at 45–64 (critiquing elision, in some New Jim Crow
scholarship, of complex roles of socioeconomic class and violent intraracial crime); see
also COOPER & SMITH, supra note 42, at 11–16 (providing tables and figures showing
significantly disproportionate rates of black homicide perpetration and victimization
despite overall decrease in homicide rates across racial categories); HARRELL, supra note
42, at 1–3 (providing tables and figures showing declining but disproportionate rates of
black violent crime victimization).
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appears as empirically unassailable as the possibilities for criminal justice reform
through democratic avenues of litigation, legislation, and activism appear dismal.
As noted above, Bannister is unusual in its extensive judicial discussion of
these issues. The opinion also is remarkable in being so thoroughly unremarked.
Months after the decision issued, it had received virtually no citation or
commentary from jurists, 64 scholars, 65 practitioners, 66 or the press. 67 This silence
may be partly ad hominem. Some view the opinion’s author, Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, as “a legal maverick” whose “liberal decisions have angered
conservatives and run afoul of appellate courts.” 68
But Bannister’s silent treatment also may illustrate disparity begetting
despairity. To be sure, disproportionate arrest, conviction, and sentencing rates
along lines of race, ethnicity, and class are not confined to the United States. 69
Nevertheless, the intractability of this country’s distinctive inequalities at the
intersection of crime, race, and poverty often lead to skepticism if not despair
toward litigation, legislation, and activism as quintessentially democratic avenues
toward sustainable reform in criminal law and procedure. In addition to the
structural factors tallied up in Bannister, commentators and jurists have recognized
the unprecedented concentration of power in the prosecution function, 70 consistent

64

Within the first twenty months of its issuance, courts cited Bannister twice, and
only to distinguish it. See United States v. Taylor, No. 11 Cr. 310 (PGG), 2012 WL
5991886, at *5 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012); United States v. Ilayayev, 800 F. Supp. 2d
417, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
65
But see Moore, supra note 13, at 1385 n.395.
66
For example, as of February 2, 2013, the website of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Attorneys contained no reference to the case. Search Results for
“Bannister”, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/ (use
“Search” bar in upper-right-hand corner; then search for “Bannister”) (netting only one
unrelated search result as of Apr. 3, 2014).
67
A cursory Google search as of April 3, 2014 revealed minimal coverage of the
decision by media outlets. But see Hays, supra note 49 (commenting on the presiding
judge’s decision to visit a crime-ridden neighborhood to assist in sentencing).
68
Hays, supra note 49. But see, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein Receives ALI’s John Minor
Wisdom Award, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R3102_04-Jackweinstein.htm
(last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (describing recipient as “‘a legal polymath’—a creative jurist, a
productive scholar, a pioneering civil rights advocate, and ‘one of the few judges whose
achievements warrant mention in the same breath as the achievements of Judge
Wisdom’”).
69
See LACEY, supra note 44 at 148–69 (discussing increased incarceration rates of
foreign nationals in the United Kingdom and several European Union members); LOÏC
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY 277–78 (George Steinmetz et al. eds., 2009) (discussing incarceration rate for
low-income, less-educated foreign nationals and first-generation descendants in France);
Molly Townes O’Brien, Criminal Law’s Tribalism, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 31, 31–32
(2011) (discussing available data indicating a “global tendency of each population to
imprison a disproportionate percentage of some minority groups”).
70
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing “the vast power and the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a
prosecutor”); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
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underfunding of indigent defense services, 71 years of racially coded tough-oncrime politics, 72 and heightened federal judicial deference to local authority 73 as
circumstances limiting opportunities to improve the fairness, efficiency, and
transparency of criminal justice systems.
Professor Nicola Lacey has observed the rise of this country’s distinctively
harsh “penal populism” from the other side of the Atlantic, noting “the general,
and depressing, conclusion” that other nations “are constrained to tread the same
path[.]” 74 The law-and-economics analysis of the late Professor William Stuntz
struck a similarly bleak tone. This leading scholar launched a jeremiad against the
“pathological politics” infecting the formulation and implementation of criminal
law and procedure. 75 As he observed with characteristic acerbity, “[O]rganized
interest group pressure to narrow criminal liability is rare.” 76
Given the improbability of a broad-based movement to reverse the
disproportionate criminal victimization and incarceration of poor people and
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (“No government official in America
has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.”).
71
See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 48, at 93–95; Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the
Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for
Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 959–74 (2010) (critiquing Professor Darryl K.
Brown’s proposals to ration service and absorb defense investigative function into law
enforcement and prosecutorial, judicial, and forensic science functions).
72
See sources cited supra note 60.
73
See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal
Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 818–33 (2009) (citing low success
of noncapital habeas petitioners to urge the elimination of habeas access for most prisoners
and reallocation of resources from the back end to the front end of litigation). But see John
H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 435, 444–56 (2011) (contesting evidence and argument for Hoffman and
King’s proposal); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the
Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 133–46 (2012) (same).
74
LACEY, supra note 44, at xv. Lacey describes institutional variances between
nations that temper the inevitability of globalized penal politics patterned after the United
States. Id. at 156–69. But see Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 108–32 (2010) (detailing international expansion of U.S.
criminal justice policies and procedures).
75
See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics]; William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 794–98 (2006)
[hereinafter Political Constitution]; William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1969, 1973–74 (2008).
76
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 75, at 553 (emphasis omitted); see also
Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 110 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
1996) (“[T]here is . . . no natural tendency for an emergence of secondary associations to
correct for inequalities of political opportunity due to underlying economic
inequalities . . . .”); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, in THE LEGAL STUDIES READER: A CONVERSATION &
READINGS ABOUT THE LAW, supra note 40, at 199, 207–08, 218–20 (identifying structural
barriers to have-nots achieving reform through litigation).
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people of color, Stuntz offered a Gilded Age recipe for promoting more democratic
decision making in criminal cases. He argued for more policing and prosecution of
cases before more locally drawn venires that exercise broader discretion in
applying fewer and more vaguely drawn criminal statutes. 77 He saw these
developments as “achievable,” but failed to explain how or why this was so, and
conceded that his proposals for related reforms were unlikely to come to fruition. 78
Stuntz was not alone in presenting a truncated view of democracy’s
possibilities in the context of criminal justice reform. Twenty years ago, Professor
Donald Dripps used public choice theory to ask and answer the question, “Why
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?” 79 More
recently, Professors Marc Miller and Ronald Wright cited tough-on-crime politics
as justifying the subordination of litigation and legislation in favor of internal
bureaucratic reform as the most effective avenue for regulating prosecutorial
decision making. 80 And the New Jim Crow scholarship, while offering the most
recent analysis of penal politics as a mechanism for caste construction and control,
points to little empirical or theoretical ground from which to reclaim law and

77
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 75, at 1974, 1982–97, 2031–39. These
arguments are also presented in WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30–31 (2011) (proposing local democracy as a possible explanation for
low crime rates and a small prison population in turn-of-the-century Chicago). But see, e.g.,
IRVIN WALLER, LESS LAW, MORE ORDER xi–xvi (2006) (citing empirical research showing
that investments in “police, courts, and corrections is not the way to prevent and reduce”
crime).
78
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 75, at 2031–39; cf. Stuntz, Pathological
Politics, supra note 75, at 510–12, 600 (conceding improbability of proposal for judicial
narrowing of overbroad and overly punitive criminal laws via federal constitution); Stuntz,
Political Constitution, supra note 75, at 785, 846–50 (concluding that recommended
reforms “probably won’t” occur and discussing legislatures’ enacting overbroad and overly
punitive criminal laws in reaction to the courts’ constitutional regulation of criminal
procedure).
79
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089–92 (1993); see also Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of
Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 604–13 (2004) (surveying public process and public
choice explanations for the fact that “[l]egislators have declined to protect criminal
defendants, except in rare and narrowly circumscribed circumstances when powerful
constituencies (the press, lawyers) have been threatened”).
80
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128–30
(2008). But see Marc L. Miller, A Map and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information
Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351,
1353–54 (2005) (highlighting state legislative sentencing reforms); Ronald F. Wright,
Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980–2000, 2002 CRIME & JUST. 39,
41–43 [hereinafter Counting the Cost] (discussing sentencing reforms in the face of
“politics of crime”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 231–42 (2004) [hereinafter Parity]
(describing successful state legislative efforts to balance prosecutorial and defense
resources through parity assessment).
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politics as viable avenues toward sustainable reform. 81 That scholarship calls for a
mass movement but fails to engage the historical difficulty of building and
sustaining coalitions across lines of race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. 82
In light of the existing scholarship, the lack of commentary on Bannister may
stem from a perception that the opinion carries coal to Newcastle. The dominant
narrative contains good reasons for skepticism toward litigation, legislation, and
activism as meaningful avenues for reducing the footprint of the carceral state
while obtaining greater transparency, accountability, and fairness in the formation
and implementation of criminal law and procedure. The hurdles to reform are
daunting. Nor is the despairity narrative confined to theorists and practitioners who
work on criminal justice issues. Similar retrenchment also is evident in broader
movements for racial 83 and economic justice. 84
C. Despairity’s Broader Context
Retrenchment within and across justice movements is a predictable response
to postindustrial economic dislocation accompanied by increasingly unbridgeable
gaps between haves and have-nots 85—including, importantly, increasing
geographic segregation by socioeconomic class.86 Intensifying concentration of
81

See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 60, at 244–51 (suggesting that successful
multiracial oppositional politics in this context may require surrendering affirmativeaction-based advocacy); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic
Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 133, 185–91 (2011)
(promoting deliberative democracy’s promotion of empathy across difference).
82
For example, released prisoner and longtime criminal justice reformer Susan
Burton suggests that defendants “crash the system” by refusing plea offers and taking cases
to trial but acknowledges that such collective action imposes significant risks to individual
defendants. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-cra
sh-the-justice-system.html.
83
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 40, at 245 (analogizing between Legal Realism and the
state of racial inequality in the United States and arguing for Racial Realism as an approach
to civil rights).
84
See, e.g., GARY J. DORRIEN, RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMON GOOD: THEOLOGY
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER vi–vii (1990) (arguing that although the “ravages . . . of poverty
have not diminished with the triumph of liberal capitalism . . . [t]he language of socialism
has become severely problematic . . . and not only because it was perverted long ago by
totalitarians”).
85
See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 21–22; Harry J. Holzer, Workforce Development
as an Antipoverty Strategy: What Do We Know? What Should We Do?, 6, 7 (Inst. for the
Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3776, 2008) (tracking an 87% decline in federal
workforce development funds from 1979, with “even greater” reduction in spending on
disadvantaged populations, and observing that spending on federal employment and
training in the United States is “just over 0.1% of GDP—a smaller fraction than is spent . . .
virtually anywhere else in the industrial world”).
86
See, e.g., Pedro Carneiro & James J. Heckman, Human Capital Policy, in
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES? 77, 84–85
(Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2003) (“Declining real wages for low-skilled workers and
increasing real returns to college graduation” combined with differential in high school
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economic power in fewer hands 87 conjoins degraded opportunities for social
mobility 88 and the flourishing of state capitalism as taxpayers rescue deregulated
industries deemed “too big to fail” 89 and too big to prosecute. 90 The rightward
ideological shift across branches of state and federal government, including the
federal courts, prioritizes the market over the commons and the individual over the
collective. 91 Retreat from social welfare guarantees 92 and the dead end of federal
constitutional avenues toward poverty relief 93 accompany the advance of an
dropout and college attendance rates will make “the America of tomorrow even more
unequal than the America of today and the America of the past.”); Lawrence F. Katz,
Comment, in id. at 269, 276–77 (discussing growing geographic concentration of poverty
in the United States); Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income
Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1099–1100, 1106–07, 1125 (discussing increased
residential segregation by income level, particularly between highest and lowest rungs of
the economic ladder and with highest rates of change occurring among black families).
87
See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 86, at 1094-96 (documenting the “U-shaped”
U.S. income inequality trend, with 2006 rates returning to disparity levels of the 1920s,
“exceptional rise” in upper-income increases, and the top decile receiving 45% of the
national income).
88
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC
MOBILITY ACROSS GENERATIONS 2–9 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ww
wpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Pursuing_American_Dream.pdf
(discussing
absolute income gains but relative and racially disparate “stickiness,” or limited mobility,
with 43% stuck at the bottom of the economic ladder).
89
See Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public
Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2010) (“By the end of
the 2009 fiscal year, the U.S. government became one of the largest shareholders in the
world owning a portfolio of investments valued at $ 959 billion.”); Mariana Pargendler,
State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2925–26 (2012)
(describing as anomalous the “partial nationalizations of distressed firms” in the United
States after the 2008 financial crisis). For a different view of state capitalism and its
historical roots in the United States, see generally William J. Novak, Law and the Social
Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377 (2010).
90
See, e.g., Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, HSBC’s Record $1.9Bn Fine Preferable to
Prosecution, US Authorities Insist, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.guard
ian.co.uk/business/2012/dec/11/hsbc-fine-prosecution-money-laundering (discussing the
U.S. Department of Justice’s declination to prosecute HSBC, one of the world’s largest
banks, for, among other things, laundering money for terrorists and drug dealers).
91
On alternatives to the hegemony of homo economicus, the classical liberal subject
as autonomous self-interest maximizer, see Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist
Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
159, 163–70, 186–89 (1992).
92
See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 85; Wendy A. Bach, Governance,
Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239, 243–50 (2010)
[hereinafter Governance]; Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power:
Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
275, 278–82 (2009) [hereinafter Welfare Reform].
93
See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race
and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122–26
(2009) (probing causes of varying judicial scrutiny afforded to class-based and race-based
claims for redress); Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of
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ostensibly race-blind public ethos and jurisprudence. 94
These developments are not unique. They mark the latest oscillation in an
ongoing contest over the appropriate location and limits of socioeconomic,
political, and legal power in state capitalist democracies. In the United States,
those tensions are radical. Founding federal documents championed equal liberty
while simultaneously denigrating the First Nations as “merciless . . . Savages” 95
and consigning black slaves to proportional personhood, 96 and while states limited
suffrage within narrow confines of gender, race, and class. 97 Historian John Hope
Franklin located this fundamental polarity in a broken promise—“the promise of
real equality, made by the Founding Fathers more than two centuries ago, a
promise neither they nor their successors kept.” 98
This tension between liberatory promise and reneging is “so fundamental—
and so morally embarrassing—that we have gone to [great] lengths to obscure
it.” 99 But cycles of reform and reaction are traceable in thirty- to fifty-year
segments. At the birth of the new republic, even within the confines of propertied
white male privilege, the transition from the post-Revolutionary Articles of
Confederation to the Constitution was hotly contested by Antifederalists opposed
to a dangerous new concentration of political authority. 100 There was particular
concern that the new structure was designed to benefit commercial elites at the
expense of the yeoman farmer and a broader common good. 101 Passions lingered

Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 630–31
(2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s effective elimination of legal redress for povertybased claims).
94
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625, 2631 (2013) (holding that
the Voting Rights Act was an unconstitutional violation of states’ rights because “things
have changed dramatically [since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act]. . . . ‘[V]oter
turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of
federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.’”
(quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009))); Reva
B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in
Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1332–38 (2011) (critically examining the raceneutral arguments underlying the decisions in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) and
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007)).
95
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 24 (U.S. 1776).
96
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
97
See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (2009) (discussing race- and gender-based
limitations on voting during founding period); id. at 16 (discussing class-based limitations);
see also id. at xx (discussing all three limitations).
98
Franklin, supra note 46, at xii.
99
William H. Chafe, Epilogue from Greensboro, North Carolina: Race and the
Possibilities of American Democracy, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 277,
278.
100
See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Antifederalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.KENT L. REV. 987, 989 (1988).
101
See, e.g., Centinel, Letter I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE
OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 16 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985) (“[T]he proposed
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after the Constitution’s ratification and ignited uprisings such as the Whiskey
Rebellion. 102
In the 1830s, transcendentalist precursors of the Social Gospel movement
decried the structural subjugation and exploitation of women and slaves as well as
the “wage slavery” to which business interests subjected the working poor.103 PostReconstruction African Americans and poor whites joined forces in Fusionist and
other progressive movements to expand social, economic, and political
opportunities. 104 In subsequent decades, labor and civil rights leaders found
common ground to combat hierarchies fed by twinned theories of socioeconomic
Darwinism and an oxymoronic “scientific racism.”
Each oppositional movement met with co-optation, reaction, and, in some
instances, outright revolution and repeal. From the Whiskey Rebellion to the Alien
and Sedition Acts; from the ethnic and sectarian riots of the 1820s and ’30s
through the horrifying violence of the Civil War and the white supremacy
movement’s murderous overthrow of Fusionist governments at the turn of the
century; from the pitched battles between capital and labor in the 1920s and ’30s to
the most recent civil rights era and its aftermath, efforts to actualize the liberatory
potential inherent in aspects of this nation’s founding have collided with the
determination of elites to obtain, retain, or regain privilege.
As the oscillation between these opposing interests continues, some see bright
spots on the horizon. In light of trends favoring globalization, deregulation, tax
reduction, and diminution of government, new governance scholars discount the
adversarial pursuit and vindication of rights through litigation and legislation in
favor of local collaboration and internal agency self-reform. 105 Others see
opportunities in the retreat from social welfare commitments to incorporate,
through state constitutions and statutes, international human rights models for
securing socioeconomic prerequisites to meaningful participation in democratic

plan . . . is a most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among freemen, that
the world has ever witnessed.”)
102
See, e.g., David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment
Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 904–08 (1996).
103
See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 643–56 (2007) (discussing confluence and divergence of
interests between abolitionists, transcendentalists, and early feminists); 2 THEODORE
PARKER, Of Justice and Conscience, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF THEODORE PARKER,
SERMONS—PRAYERS 37, 48 (Francis Power Cobbe ed., 1879) (“I do not pretend to
understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways . . .
from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.”).
104
See 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMM’N, 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT
REPORT 35–46 (2006) [hereinafter WILMINGTON REPORT], available at http://www.history.
ncdcr.gov/1898-wrrc/report/report.htm; David S. Cecelski & Timothy B. Tyson, Preface,
in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at xii, xiv; Michael Honey, Class, Race, and
Power in the New South: Racial Violence and the Delusions of White Supremacy, in
DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 163, 174; infra Part III.B.
105
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace
Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 248–51 (2006).
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self-governance. 106 From an increasingly dominant “race-blind” civil rights
jurisprudence, Professor Reva Siegel wrestles a core commitment to the
vindication of individual human dignity and community harmony (or at least to the
minimization of intergroup resentment). 107
Some commentators on criminal law and procedure also accentuate the
positive. A “liberty affirming” theme is detected in post-Warren era rulings that
heralded the Supreme Court’s resurgent conservatism. 108 Professors Marc Miller
and Ronald Wright identify unexpected pockets of legislative support for criminal
justice-system improvements. 109 David Cole views converging interest in cost
cutting during tight fiscal times as a sign that the nation is “turning the corner on
mass incarceration.” 110 And Inhofe and Murkowski might be surprised by the
scope and history of North Carolina’s pioneering full open-file criminal discovery
reform. 111
But there may be some whistling past the graveyard in all of the foregoing
scholarship. Some scholars challenge new governance theories as masking old
patterns of deference to market-driven paradigms, and as failing to account for the
barriers to expanding deliberative democracy beyond the usual cadre of elites. 112
Theologian Gary Dorrien questions the possibility of meaningful poverty reduction
in a polity that often brands analysis of income disparity as class warfare and views
discussion of income guarantees or other significant resource redistribution as
socialist anathema. 113 And it is reasonable to worry that antibalkanization analysis
embodies an uncomfortably familiar solicitude for the feelings of wounded white
privilege. 114
106

See, e.g., Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
351, 391–404 (2008).
107
See Siegel, supra note 94, at 1298–1303, 1352.
108
Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Lessons of
Reading Criminal Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1047 (2005).
109
See Miller, supra note 80, at 1359–63; Wright, Counting the Cost, supra note 80,
at 58–77; Wright, Parity, supra note 80, at 263–68.
110
See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 27, 31 (2011).
111
See Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–77 (detailing the legislative history of open-file
criminal discovery reform).
112
See, e.g., Susan Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times:
Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?,
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 343–49 (2007); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance
Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 338–63 (2009).
113
GARY DORRIEN, ECONOMY, DIFFERENCE, EMPIRE: SOCIAL ETHICS FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE 139–50, 187–93 (2010); see also MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC
STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 14–15, 33–
34, 152–54 (2013) (tracing U.S. history of justifying resource redistribution by casting
recipients as innocent disaster victims).
114
See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (2008)
(discussing civil rights jurisprudence that measures relief “less by the character of harm
suffered by blacks than the degree of disadvantage the relief sought will impose on
whites”); cf. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY xvii (1932)
(“[W]ill a disinherited group, such as the Negroes for instance, ever win full justice in
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In criminal justice scholarship, the despairity narrative can cast rosier views in
a similarly cold light. The Supreme Court’s purported “liberty affirming” turn can
readily be reframed as a sympathetic (and selective) response to tough-on-crime
politics. 115 Convergent interests around cost cutting have historically proven to be
evanescent motivators of criminal justice reform. 116 And it will take more focused
empirical research to discern the feet-on-the-street effectiveness of initiatives such
as funding parity for prosecutors and public defenders 117 or statewide, full openfile discovery. 118
This Article responds to these deeply rooted tensions and recurring
oscillations by arguing for the development of a democracy-enhancing theory of
criminal law and procedure as a more stable ground—at least complementary if not
philosophically and strategically superior to budget-driven interest convergence—
for sustainable reform at the intransigent intersection of crime, race, and poverty
that Bannister maps so vividly. Part II explains the attraction of a democracyenhancement theory and sketches its contours. While roughly honed, this
theoretical lens is adequate for the analytical and normative work undertaken in
Parts III through V.
II. DEMOCRACY ENHANCEMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
This Part sketches the contours of a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal
law and procedure. Part II.A defines “democracy” as it is used in the ensuing
argument. Part II.B anticipates and responds to some objections against the
democracy-enhancement frame. Part II.C clarifies distinctions between democracy
enhancement and the two major theoretical justifications for criminal conviction
and punishment: retributivism, which emphasizes individual moral culpability, and
utilitarianism, which emphasizes deterrence. Part II.D identifies some resources for
the future task of fully articulating a democracy-enhancement theory.
A. Defining Democracy
Professor Nicola Lacey frames democracy as a set of core values embodying
“the will of citizens” enacted through their “participation . . . in decision-making”
along with “accountability of officials for proper conduct and effective delivery of
policies in the public interest[,] adherence to the rule of law and respect for human
rights.” 119 Working within that framework, this Article defines democracy
society [through accommodation]? Will not even its most minimum demands seem
exorbitant to the dominant whites, among whom only a very small minority will regard the
inter-racial problem from the perspective of objective justice?”).
115
Joseph E. Kennedy, Cautious Liberalism, 94 GEO. L.J. 1537, 1548–53 (2004).
116
See, e.g., MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMATORIES, AND CHAIN GANGS:
SOCIAL THEORY AND THE HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 69–71, 106–07 (1997)
(describing role of budget crises in penology’s historical “cycles of reform, stagnation, and
repression”).
117
See Wright, Parity, supra note 80, at 253–62.
118
Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–77.
119
LACEY, supra note 44, at 9.
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enhancement as the promotion of individual and communal self-governance.
Minimally, self-governance means exercising rational and emotional intelligence
to check concentrated power. Maximally, democracy enhancement promotes the
exercise of moral imagination through equal participation by individuals-incommunity in the pursuit of equal dignity and human flourishing. 120
The metaethical stance is pragmatic and eclectic. The theory aims to bridge
oppositions between retributivism’s deontological rules, which emphasize the
autonomous individual’s generation of and submission to the morally just precept,
and utilitarianism’s teleological goals, which emphasize maximal well-being.
Kantian respect for the equal dignity of persons unites with critical theory’s
recognition that communicative action necessarily entails intersubjectivity.
Appreciation for classical virtues—courage, temperance, prudence, and justice—is
tempered by Niebuhrian suspicion of hubris, perfectionism, and end-of-history
narratives. 121
The subject of self-governance, the individual-in-community, is more than a
consumer or producer of goods. 122 Self-governance is an activity occurring
simultaneously and in multiple spheres. At the level of individual impulse, selfgovernance involves interaction between the amygdala and the frontal lobe. Selfgovernance also unfolds in contests and collaboration between and among
individuals, groups, institutions and other collective interests.
Thus, democracy as self-governance is simultaneously an ongoing set of
activities and an ideal never fully achieved. 123 In the criminal justice context,
democracy occurs more or less—mostly less at the intersection of crime, race, and
poverty—as actors exercise and shape discretion in varied settings, often with
multiple, overlapping, and shifting roles.
Criminal justice stories involve perpetrators and victims, accusers and
accused. But as the Bannister decision indicates, those actors and identities are just
the tip of the iceberg. Relevant acts and omissions also flow from parents,
extended families, schools, neighborhood organizations, and churches; businesses,
foundations, and public service providers; the popular press and other media;
legislative and executive branch representatives (including mayors, governors, and
appointed panels or commissions) and their constituencies; law enforcement,
prosecutors, defense counsel, juries, and judges; corrections personnel, and
probation, parole, or other reentry workers.

120

Moore, supra note 91, at 159, 163–70, 186–89.
See, e.g., REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 138 (1952) (“A
too confident sense of justice always leads to injustice.”); cf. CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY
DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 17 (1982) (“This
emphasis on process, development discontinuity, and even disruption precludes the
possibility of human perfection and human utopias.”).
122
Moore, supra note 91, at 167–70.
123
Cf. Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 31,
43 (1996) (“Democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of
government: as a mode of being that is conditioned by bitter experience, doomed to
succeed only temporarily, but is a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the
political survives.”).
121
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To enhance democracy in the formation, implementation, and oversight of
criminal law and procedure, particularly at the tail end of these relational networks,
is to prioritize participation by the low-income and minority individuals who are
most directly and disproportionately affected by crime and criminal justice
systems, particularly at the front end. Such an approach has the potential not only
to improve crime prevention and case outcomes, but also to shore up the often
fragile legitimacy of what many perceive, with some justification, to be criminal
injustice systems.
To that end, a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure
persistently asks whether and how particular developments promote selfgovernance, the reduction of the carceral footprint, and the shaping and oversight
of criminal justice policies and institutions by the low-income and minority
individuals and communities disproportionately affected by crime, its causes, and
its consequences. This approach incorporates aspects of traditional justifications
for criminal law while demanding more. Democracy enhancement takes moral
desert more seriously than retributivism, aims for more effective deterrence than
utilitarianism, sharpens the focus of rehabilitative theory, and may provide more
stable ground for the healing relationships that constitute restorative justice.
B. Why Democracy?
The call for a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure
raises important questions. Their comprehensive identification and discussion is
beyond the preliminary sketch offered here, but several warrant immediate
attention. Is democracy enhancement too narrow a lens through which to reimagine
and refocus criminal law and procedure? Does this focus foreground procedure at
the expense of substantive justice? Conversely, is democracy enhancement too
protean a concept to be useful? Does this approach improperly discount interest
convergence and cost-benefit analysis as effective reform tactics?
1. Is Democracy Too Small?
Professor Allegra McLeod helpfully raises the first questions about the limits
of a democracy-enhancing focus, noting that attempts to improve existing criminal
justice systems are often merely ameliorative and can even make things worse. 124
McLeod rightly insists that reformers must keep their eyes unswervingly on the
decarceration prize. 125 To that end, she argues for an imaginative stance that
identifies and pursues “unfinished alternatives” to the carceral state. 126

124
Allegra McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1615–30 (2012) [hereinafter Decarceration Courts]
(discussing flaws in alternative court models).
125
Id. at 1632; see also Allegra McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The
Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 109, 129–30
(2013) [hereinafter Confronting Violence] (arguing for regrounding of social controls
outside of criminal justice apparatuses).
126
McLeod, Confronting Violence, supra note 125, at 132.
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The carceral norm is a national addiction. Reformers too readily serve as
enablers. But McLeod’s decarceration proposals require more than expanded
“imaginative horizons.” 127 They require revised patterns of resource allocation. 128
Those revisions in turn require a robust and sustainable oppositional politics.
A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure aims
simultaneously to reimagine the justification and purpose of criminal justice
systems while reducing the footprint of the carceral state. The theory does so by
prioritizing the empowerment of low-income and minority individuals and
communities to participate more fully in the formation and implementation of
criminal justice policies.
That participation is not merely procedural, nor is it an end in itself. The
animating principle and goal of a democracy-enhancing theory is the actualization
of equal human dignity. Essential prerequisites include reducing criminal
offending and victimization as well as the predictable causes and consequences of
crime discussed in Bannister. Thus, a democracy-enhancing theory bridges
dichotomies pitting procedural versus substantive justice, utilitarian goals versus
deontological rules, and the exercise of free will by autonomous individuals versus
the collective generation and enforcement of norms and identities.
2. Is Democracy Too Large?
A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure acknowledges
cost-benefit analysis and interest convergence as useful reform tactics. But there
are good reasons to maintain an arm’s-length partnership with homo
economicus, 129 some of which are empirical.
As noted above, budget cutting grows more or less salient as state capitalism
spins through repetitive boom-and-bust cycles. Moreover, as discussed in Part
IV.B.1, “smart on crime” and “justice reinvestment” initiatives tend to morph away
from evidence-based prevention via human capital development and toward
extension of surveillance and control structures. Those policy choices are
predictable despite their criminogenesis 130 and the fact that evidence-based
prevention costs pennies on the increasingly scarce tax dollar. 131 Indeed, as
Professor James Forman notes, black-majority jurisdictions, such as Washington,
D.C., also exhibit tough-on-crime hyperincarceration patterns. 132
Such decision making belies rational choice theory in part because the theory
rests on a flawed account of human subjectivity. On that account, the subject is
127

Id. at 113.
Id. at 113, 116, 118, 130.
129
See supra note 91. I thank Mike Cassidy for inspiring the analysis in this subpart.
130
See, e.g., L.M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment:
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 606,
614–16 (2007) (documenting and discussing criminogenic effect of imprisonment).
131
See infra Part IV.C.1.
132
James Forman, Jr., The Roots of Prosecutorial Discretion: How Mandatory
Minimums Came to Washington, D.C.’s Local Courts, Notes for Panel Presentation at
Mid-Year Meeting of Ass’n of Am. Law Schools, San Diego, California (June 11, 2013)
(on file with Author).
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first and foremost a consumer of goods—a radically individuated, calculating selfinterest maximizer. Yet according to Professor Daniel Kahneman, winner of a
Nobel Prize in economics, “it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational
nor completely selfish, and that their tastes are anything but stable.” 133 Emotion
regularly trumps critical analysis. 134 Fear and anger over crime and perceptions of
crime override data-driven policy making.
Moreover, to the extent that self-interested rationality is at work, cycles of
criminogenesis, victimization, arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and recidivism
feed too many families. Interests converging around cost cutting inevitably collide
with countervailing, converging interests of myriad stakeholders. Among the more
obvious are law enforcement officers and forensic analysts; prosecutors and victim
advocates; judges and court personnel; probation and parole officers; and defense
attorneys, investigators, and paralegals. Layers of administrators keep the
machinery running. Jails and prisons employ thousands, with prisons increasingly
run for profit and sited in low-income rural areas. Universities and nonprofit
organizations receive millions of dollars annually in tax and foundation dollars to
evaluate, critique, advise, and attempt to reform these stakeholders and the systems
in which they are mutually embedded.
Cost-benefit analysis and interest convergence are useful tactics for treating
symptoms but cannot cure such metastasis.
3. Is Democracy Just Right?
There are more than empirical reasons for circumspection toward privileging
cost-benefit analysis and interest convergence in the struggle for sustainable
criminal justice reform. Democracy enhancement draws upon a richer and deeper
normative commitment—often overshadowed, if not actively repressed, by
dominant utilitarian analyses—to the equal dignity of persons. 135
As discussed in Part I.C, it is ultimately the deep normative pull of that
commitment—the commitment to fulfill what Franklin called the broken promise
of “real equality” 136—that explains small and large expansions of human rights and
corresponding obligations in the struggle against equally radical commitments to
the development and maintenance of hierarchy. 137 The democracy deficit at the
intersection of crime, race, and poverty throws the unsatisfactory nature of that
progress into sharp relief.
Professor Steven L. Winter’s archeology of democratic theory is helpful in
unpacking these points. Winter highlights the critical role of interpersonal respect
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DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 269 (2011).
See, e.g., id. at 252–53 (discussing optimistic bias); id. at 380–85 (discussing the
peak-end rule and duration neglect).
135
See Moore, supra note 91.
136
Franklin, supra note 46, at xii.
137
Cf. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920, at 373 (1986) (noting
that only deeply norm-driven reforms can “be more than cosmetic”).
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in the classical conception of isonomia. 138 He contrasts democracy’s philosophical
and etymological roots, which are grounded in the power (kratos) of the masses
(demos), with those of isonomia, which references equal participation in the
generation and administration of law. 139
Winter’s discussion of isonomia points to an underlying historical shift from
thesmos to nomos—from the external to the internal generation of perceived
obligation. 140 Legitimacy means lawfulness. That meaning derives from mutuality.
Winter emphasizes that the collaborative activity of self-governance requires
“fortitude and initiative—the virtue” of habitually and actively controlling public
institutions. 141 As the Bannister opinion indicates, unique hurdles impede the
development and exercise of these capacities at the intersection of crime, race, and
poverty.
A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure aims to knock
down those hurdles. In terms of deep norms and theory, this approach claims
isomoiria, the joinder of political and economic equality, 142 as a precondition of
isonomia, mutual and legitimate self-governance. Expressly claiming Franklin’s
“real equality” as a deep norm allows a democracy-enhancing theory to
incorporate and improve upon the traditional criminal law justifications of
retributivism and deterrence.
C. Democracy Enhancement and Criminal Theory
Retributivism insists that “free will offers an escape” 143 from circumstances,
such as resource disparities, that provide contexts for and shape decision making.
On this theory, it is the ineluctably moral decision of an autonomous individual to
do an illegal act that warrants condemnation and punishment. Retributivism’s
focus on individual moral desert allows for consideration of resource disparities
(whether capital, human, or social) at various pivot points in the system. Existing
data collection and assessment limit analysis of the degree to which those factors
affect declination by crime victims, law enforcement officers, and prosecutors,
respectively, to accuse, arrest, or charge. Consideration of these factors is most
regularized in the application of rules that mitigate charge level and sentence.144 A
blunter instrument is the Supreme Court’s recent use of developmental
neurobiology to draw bright-line sentencing limits under the Eighth
Amendment. 145
138

Steven L. Winter, Down Freedom’s Main Line, 41 NETHERLANDS J. LEGAL PHIL.
202, 237 (2012).
139
Id. at 237–38.
140
Id. at 237 n.118.
141
Id. at 240.
142
Id. at 238 n.123.
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United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
144
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 42, at 38 (discussing Vera’s work); Miller & Wright,
supra note 80, at 155–59; Spohn, supra note 36, at 473–78, 481.
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Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding mandatory life
imprisonment unconstitutional for juveniles); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
559–60 (2004) (barring juvenile executions); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16
(2002) (barring execution of defendants with mental retardation).
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But retributivism is itself profoundly immoral to the extent that it fails to
account for and remediate structural disparities that, on one hand, significantly
enhance the rewards of criminal offending, 146 and, on the other, inhibit
participation in policy formation and implementation—that is, the definition of
crime and the oversight of its enforcement—by the low-income people and people
of color who have disproportionate contact with crime and criminal justice
systems. A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure should
focus like a laser on the concentrated disadvantage that characterizes the
intersection of crime, race, and poverty to promote the development and exercise
of personal and communal self-governance.
A democracy-enhancement emphasis can usefully recalibrate other traditional
theoretical justifications for criminal law. For utilitarians, this new emphasis holds
promise for addressing the delegitimization and reduced deterrent effect of
criminal justice systems for those excluded from system generation and oversight.
Democracy enhancement’s prioritization of self-governance also can productively
refine rehabilitative theory by directing efforts toward fuller integration of
individuals-in-community and citizens into the polity. With respect to restorative
justice, enhancing self-governance by redressing real and perceived disparities in
power, authority, and privilege within and across the systems in which crime and
punishment are generated can improve possibilities for—and, indeed, is likely
prerequisite to—personal healing and mending of broken relationships.
D. Resources for Theory Building
Future work will hone this quick sketch of a democracy-enhancing theory for
criminal law and procedure. There are a number of resources for the task. Again,
pragmatism entails eclecticism. Theory development should be interdisciplinary.
Debates among criminologists are salient, particularly as they contest the racial
invariance of concentrated disadvantage as a factor causing criminal justice
involvement. 147 Social psychology and other cognitive sciences, including
developmental neurobiology, also have much to offer. Pertinent areas of
investigation include identification of factors that contribute to or hinder resiliency
in the face of stress, 148 as well as discussions of the existence, verifiability, and
146

Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1774–87 (1992).
147
On the debate over racial invariance in the relationship between concentrated
disadvantage and crime, compare Sampson & Bean, supra note 38, at 8, 11 (discussing
“resilient” invariance findings related to “factors representing disadvantage, e.g., differing
combinations of poverty, income, family disruption, and joblessness/unemployment”), with
Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Structural Disadvantage and
Crime: White, Black, and Hispanic Comparisons, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 799, 800 (2012) (“[T]he
degree to which differences across groups in structural disadvantage predict racial or ethnic
differences in violence is far from settled.”).
148
See, e.g., M.E.M. Haglund et al., Psychobiological Mechanisms of Resilience:
Relevance to Prevention and Treatment of Stress-Related Psychopathology, 19
DEVELOPMENT & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 889, 894–96 tbl.1, 906 tbl.2, 910 tbl.3 (2007)
(summarizing neurochemical, neurological, and behavioral linkages to traumatic stress and
resiliency).
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implications of implicit or unconscious bias—whether those biases are rooted in
differences between racial or ethnic groups, socioeconomic classes, or gender
identities. 149
As a leading skeptic on the role of both implicit bias and conscious
discrimination in causing racial disparities in the workplace, Professor Amy Wax
notes that calls to redress underlying “pervasive substantive inequalities” tend to
“say very little about how to do that.” 150 In addition to the resources noted above,
the scholarship of Professor Matthew Adler in social welfare economics, as well as
that of Professors Iris Marion Young and Seyla Benhabib in political philosophy,
offers useful framing devices to at least begin saying more “about how to do that”
descriptive and normative work.
Development of a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure
resonates with Adler’s pathbreaking work on fair distribution as central to
inequality-averse social welfare economic theory. 151 Adler’s framing of social
welfare economic theory emphasizes the discipline’s normative clout.152 He resists
the prevalent cabining of utilitarian well-being to the satisfaction of personal
preference. He deduces a formula for evaluating the contribution of decision
outcomes to enhanced individual well-being with priority given to improving the
lot of the less well-off. Significant for purposes of developing a democracyenhancing theory of criminal law and procedure, Adler acknowledges the need to
account for the extent to which individuals shape their own opportunities and life
histories. 153 Personal responsibility, or free will, must be incorporated as a variable
in his economic calculus.
In the field of political philosophy, Young and Benhabib provide feminist
revisions of critical theory’s discourse model. These scholars work with the
model’s three core commitments: (1) communication and, more specifically,
rational argument is constitutive of human identity; (2) an ideal speech situation
requires commitment to consensus, such that all who are affected by a discourse
outcome agree to that outcome (the universalization principle); and (3) all
149

See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Supply Side or Discrimination?, Assessing the Role of
Unconscious Bias, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 877, 887–902 (2011) (surveying literature and
challenging empirical support for unconscious bias as a causal factor capable of objective
proof or redress through law). But see, e.g., State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314–15, 98
CRS 34832, 30544, & 01 CRS 65079 at 2, 20–24, 90–95 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012)
(vacating death sentences based in part on prosecutors’ implicit racial biases against
African American prospective jurors), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja_or
der_12-13-12.pdf.
150
Wax, supra note 149, at 900–02 (discussing Ralph Richard Banks & Richard
Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial
Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009)).
151
See Janet Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s Move
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. SOCIAL JUSTICE 1025, 1036 (2013) (“An
economic theory that shifts the analysis from gross satisfaction of personal preference to
inequality reduction can be a powerful tool for public defense reform advocates.”
(discussing ADLER, supra note 37)).
152
ADLER, supra note 37, at 12 (describing cost-benefit analysis as “a kind of moral
decision procedure”).
153
Id. at 36–38.
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interested parties must have equal and unhindered access to full participation in the
conversation (the discourse principle). 154 Young and Benhabib insist that the
intersubjective communication that is the core of democratic processes and
outcomes requires mining messy, highly particularized, real-world differences
among people. 155 That process in turn requires satisfaction of basic material needs
that are prerequisites to participation. 156
Young’s reframing of critical theory’s discourse model may be particularly
helpful in fleshing out a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and
procedure. She prioritizes three questions: Who is at the table? Who is speaking or
purporting to speak for whom? Who is privileging which manner of
communication? 157 These questions must remain front and center in addressing the
democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty.
In Young’s assessment, adversarialism is built into consensus generation as a
necessary oppositional moment. Deliberation requires capacities for “nosaying,” 158 self-reflection, and reality checking as participants struggle to see, hear,
and understand contentions raised from perspectives different from their own. In
Young’s phrasing, “struggle is a process of communicative engagement” between
members of a democratic society; because the “field of struggle is not level[,] . . .
[d]isorderly, disruptive, annoying, or distracting means of communication are often
necessary.” 159 Young therefore resists moves to restrict discourses or their mode of
expression to formal argument, appeals to a common good, or those that some
label as moderate and civil.
By retaining discourse theory’s dual emphases on equal access to deliberative
processes and the production of genuine consensus, Young distinguishes her
“agonistic” description of democratic formation as struggle from liberal theory’s
“aggregative model.” 160 In her view, the latter entails zero-sum, majoritarian
competition among ostensibly morally neutral policy preferences—a competition
that fails to afford adequate structural protections against the perpetuation and
reinforcement of “might makes right” dominance. 161 In contrast, a theory that is
fully attentive to particularized differences of other-regarding equals obtains a
richer capacity for intersubjective transformation and the reshaping of “private,
self-regarding desire into public appeals to justice.” 162
154

See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 22–51 (2000); Seyla
Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 69–74, 78, 81–87
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
155
See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 154, at 37–44.
156
Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 154, at 120, 121; Benhabib,
supra note 154, at 67, 84.
157
YOUNG, supra note 154, at 37–44.
158
Stephen K. White & Evan Farr, “No-Saying” in Habermas, 40 POL. THEORY 32,
33 (2012).
159
YOUNG, supra note 154, at 50–51.
160
Id. at 49–51.
161
Id. at 50–51.
162
Id.
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It is in this possibility of intersubjective transformation that the messy
struggle toward democracy—power of the people—converges with the elusive
goal of isonomia: mutuality in generation and administration of the law. Critics
question whether that possibility can be actualized on any meaningful scale and
challenge the real-world efficacy of both social welfare economics 163 and
deliberativist models as avenues toward change. 164
For example, skeptics focus both on the improbability of any broad,
sustainable will to engage in such communication 165 and the inefficiency of
oppositional, self-reflective moments that inevitably become to a greater or lesser
degree “[d]isorderly, disruptive, annoying, or distracting.” 166 Recent empirical
research supports a more hopeful view. 167 For example, people want to engage in
face-to-face deliberation on policy matters—and seize opportunities to do so,
including across boundaries of class, race, and ethnicity—more readily than
skeptics might anticipate. 168 And in some circumstances, “deliberative drift”
allows communication to shift back and forth across the border between zero-sum
negotiations and richer normative discourse, trust-building, and engagement
toward consensus building. 169
But a more pointed criticism highlights the challenges and failures of efforts
to empower those at the receiving end of systems. The low-income and minority
communities most directly and disproportionately affected by crime, its causes,
and its consequences face onerous obstacles to active participation in the
formation, implementation, and oversight of the policies and institutions that create
and maintain those systems. 170 Parts III through V respond to that concern by
testing the rudimentary democracy-enhancement theory sketched here. They do so

163

See, e.g., Moore, supra note 151, at 1045–50 (engaging critiques of Adler’s work).
See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn
Politics into Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 115–16 (2002) (“the demands of
deliberation . . . are so onerous that there are good reasons to believe they cannot be
achieved by human society as currently constituted—as deliberativists themselves
concede.” (citing AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
357 (1996)).
165
Id. at 124–27 (concluding that “[t]he behavior necessary to satisfy the demands of
deliberation stands quite outside anything that can be achieved”).
166
YOUNG, supra note 154, at 50.
167
Taslitz, supra note 81, at 168–73.
168
See, e.g., Jane Mansbridge et al., The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power
in Deliberative Democracy, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 64, 73–74 (2010); Michael A. Neblo et al.,
Who Wants to Deliberate—and Why?, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 566, 574–75 (2010) (finding
younger people, lower-income people, and minorities are more willing to deliberate than
predicted); see also Benhabib, supra note 154, at 73–74, 84–87 (discussing deliberation
through “multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations” and concluding that
“the deliberative theory of democracy is not a theory in search of practice; rather it . . .
elucidate[s] . . . the logic of existing democratic practice”).
169
Peter McLaverty & Darren Halpin, Deliberative Drift: The Emergence of
Deliberation in the Policy Process, 29 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 197, 202–04, 208 (2008).
170
See, e.g., Bach, Welfare Reform, supra note 92, at 307–18 (discussing the
empowerment of historically “less-powerful groups” to attain a collaborative government).
164
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by mapping a previously unnoticed constellation of criminal justice reforms in a
single and improbable jurisdiction, the border-south state of North Carolina.
III. A PRETTY QUESTION: WHY NORTH CAROLINA?
Given the depth and intransigence of the resource disparities encountered in
circumstances of concentrated disadvantage and the correspondingly limited
political capital of the low-income and minority communities that
disproportionately experience crime and criminal justice systems, reform
initiatives within these systems are remarkable—and should be remarked upon. 171
It is especially interesting to find a constellation of cutting-edge reforms in a single
jurisdiction seldom seen as a hotbed of progressive politics. 172 North Carolina is a
case in point. 173
This jurisdiction was the first in the nation to adopt mandatory, statewide full
open-file discovery in criminal cases.174 Full open-file discovery resulted from
hard-fought litigation and the opportunistic exploitation of what was, by all
appearances, a wholly unpromising political moment. 175 Despite pushback from
prosecutors, the case law and legislative history have continued to trend toward
greater openness and enforceability. 176

171

See Moore, supra note 13, at 1375–77; cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the
Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1499 (2012) (reviewing BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) and
querying institutional explanations for North Carolina’s distinctive Innocence Inquiry
Commission). Some remark that things could be worse. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy
and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 234–48 (2007) (describing the “substantially
contracted” field of criminal law’s effect on “most people” and the failure of many toughon-crime bills in three state legislatures); cf. VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF
IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES
OFFENDERS 111–12 (2009) (citing failed proposals to require killing or castrating sex
offenders in Washington’s Community Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010–
.903 (1990)).
172
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., The Decline of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/the-decline-of-north-carolina.
html?_r=0 (discussing “Moral Monday” protests against “the grotesque damage that a new
Republican majority has been doing to a tradition of caring for the least fortunate”).
173
Aspects of the analysis in this Part are drawn from the Brief of Amici Curiae
Historians and Law Professors in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief
Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act, State v. Al-Bayyinah, No. 98 CRS 836, 1009 (Davie
County, N.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010), which the Author researched and wrote after
representing Mr. al-Bayyinah on direct appeal. State v. al-Bayyinah, 567 S.E.2d 120 (N.C.
2002) (vacating convictions and death sentence); State v. al-Bayyinah, 616 S.E.2d 500
(N.C. 2005) (affirming convictions and death sentence after retrial), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1076 (2006).
174
Moore, supra note 13, at 1378–79.
175
Id. at 1379.
176
Id. at 1379–84. That trend is due in part to legislative accommodation of prosecutorial concerns for fair accountability and enforceability with respect to investigative
agencies that possess discoverable material without prosecutors’ knowledge or control. Id.
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But full open-file discovery is just one of several pioneering criminal justice
reforms in this single and unlikely jurisdiction. As discussed in more detail in Part
IV, other cutting-edge reforms have focused on identifying and reducing wrongful
convictions; increasing efficiency and lessening cost; and curing demographic
disparities in criminal offending and victimization as well as in the processing of
criminal cases. Before describing that constellation of reforms, this Part searches
the state’s socioeconomic and political history for some clues about their genesis.
Hunting for hints of democracy enhancement at the intersection of race, crime, and
poverty reveals a pattern better described as democracy assaulting.
A. Race, Populism, and Tar Heel Politics: An Introduction
North Carolina’s previously unheralded leadership in criminal justice reform
raises what historian V.O. Key, Jr. described in 1949 as the “pretty question”
regarding jurisdictional motivations and aptitudes for change. 177 Key’s opus,
Southern Politics in State and Nation, is best known for developing racial threat
analysis and linking it to what was then a distinctively weak adversarial partisan
politics across southern states. 178
Key labeled North Carolina as the South’s “Progressive Plutocracy.” 179 He
saw the state as “far more ‘presentable’ than its southern neighbors” in business,
education, “race relations . . . [and] scrupulously orderly” political processes. 180 He
praised the state’s “consistently sensitive appreciation of Negro rights” and “spirit
of self-examination” driven in part by a strong commitment to public education. 181
Key left much untold. He ignored or belittled the active role African
Americans played in crafting their own political and economic destiny. 182 He
papered over the state’s history of murderous racial violence. 183 He was inattentive
177

V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 208 (1949) (“What
moves a people to action . . . is a pretty question.”).
178
Id. at 5–11; see also Dan T. Carter, More than Race: Conservatism in the White
South Since V.O. Key Jr., in UNLOCKING V.O. KEY JR.: “SOUTHERN POLITICS” FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 130 (Angie Maxwell & Todd G. Shields eds., 2011) [hereinafter
UNLOCKING KEY] (summarizing Key’s racial threat analysis). Scholars rank Southern
Politics as “easily comparable” to Myrdal’s An American Dilemma and Woodward’s The
Strange Career of Jim Crow. Ronald Keith Gaddie & Justin J. Wert, Before KKV, V.O. Key
Jr.: Southern Politics and Social Science Methodology, in UNLOCKING KEY at 77–78, 84.
179
KEY, supra note 177, at 205.
180
Id. In Key’s view, the state’s political leadership was “stodgy and conservative”
but never consisted of “scoundrels or nincompoops.” Id. at 211.
181
Id. at 209.
182
Kari Frederickson, World War II, White Violence, and Black Politics in V.O. Key
Jr.’s Southern Politics, in UNLOCKING KEY, supra note 178, at 39, 39–41 (chiding Key’s
“secondary interest” in “[w]hat actual black people might have been doing” to shape the
political landscape); Carter, supra note 178, at 129–30 (describing Key’s treatment of
African American southerners as passive victims); id. at 138 (describing interlocking roles
of race and class in southern political culture).
183
KEY, supra note 177, at 208 (describing the violent white supremacist revolution
against biracial Fusionist governments as a “bitter” campaign through which Democrats
redeemed the state from “shameless corruption”). Reconstruction-era corruption in North
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to class differences and elided the conditions of the working poor who operated the
textile and tobacco mills owned by the state’s “economic oligarchy.” 184 He failed
to account for the pivotal role of evangelical Christianity in the formation of
southern politics, and he also ignored the role of women. 185
Despite these omissions, aspects of Key’s description accurately reflect a
powerful mythos that continues to shape perception and action in North
Carolina. 186 A broad progressive streak runs sometimes beneath, sometimes
alongside, and almost always against strains of conservatism and reactionary
extremism. Key emphasized the former aspect of the state’s Janus-faced
sociopolitical culture. 187 Frank Porter Graham and Terry Sanford are typically
identified with this lesser-known aspect. 188 In contrast, for many, the state’s
dominant aspect is indelibly embodied in Jesse Helms, “an unyielding icon of
conservatives and archenemy of liberals.” 189
For thirty years, North Carolina voters sent Helms to the U.S. Senate as a
champion of low taxes, small government, free markets, and traditional social
values. As one voter put it, it was impossible to “get to the right of Helms without
falling plumb off the Earth.” Some put Helms alongside Ronald Reagan as a key
catalyst and communicator of conservatism’s resurgence in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries. 190 Nationally syndicated political columnist David
Carolina was dominated by whites and “transcended party lines.” See, e.g., ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 387–89 (1984).
184
KEY, supra note 177, at 211–15.
185
Charles Reagan Wilson, The Morality-Driven South: Populists, Prohibitionists,
Religion, and V.O. Key Jr.’s Southern Politics, in UNLOCKING KEY, supra note 178, at 3–5
(critiquing Key’s failure to account for the role of evangelical Christianity in the formation
of southern politics); Carter, supra note 178, at 129–30 (describing Key’s failures to
account for the role of women).
186
Mythos is not “something antithetical to fact . . . opposed to reality . . . primitive or
arbitrary.” Martin L. Bowles, Myth, Meaning, and Work Organization, 10 ORG. STUD. 405,
406–08 (1989). Mythology comprises deeply rooted interpretive constructs invoked to
make sense of the world and one’s role within it. See id. The concept poses no challenge to
sociologists’ view of culture as practice. See Sampson & Bean, supra note 38, at 27–28.
187
KEY, supra note 177, at 205–10 (summarizing the history of North Carolina’s
“Progressive Plutocracy”). But see supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text (critiquing
omissions in Key’s analysis); ROB CHRISTENSEN, THE PARADOX OF TAR HEEL POLITICS:
THE PERSONALITIES, ELECTIONS, AND EVENTS THAT SHAPED MODERN NORTH CAROLINA
1–3 (2008) (noting the difficulty of “pigeonhol[ing]” North Carolina politics); Franco
Ordonez, Attention North Carolina Is Getting Isn’t Quite What It Wants, MCCLATCHY
WASH. BUREAU (May 25, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/25/150208/attentio
n-north-carolina-is-getting.html (describing Paul Luebke’s division of the state’s cultural
actors between “modernizers and traditionalists”).
188
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 187, at 3; ROBERT R. KORSTAD & JAMES L. LELOUDIS,
TO RIGHT THESE WRONGS: THE NORTH CAROLINA FUND AND THE BATTLE TO END
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN 1960S AMERICA 12 (2010).
189
David S. Broder, Jesse Helms, White Racist, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2001, reposted
July 7, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/
06/AR2008070602321.html.
190
WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 5–9 (2008); see also Larry J. Sabato, The Political Parties and PACs:
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Broder also described Helms as the nation’s “last prominent unabashed white
racist politician.” 191
The roots of North Carolina’s racialized politics run deep and are particularly
tangled at the intersection of race, crime, and poverty. Historically, the State’s
formation and application of criminal law and procedure, like the use of extralegal
violence, have been closely focused on the intersection of race, class, and gender
hierarchies. Colonial slave codes morphed into nineteenth-century black codes,
which sprang into new life in post-Reconstruction Jim Crow laws. Such shapeshifting typically responded to socioeconomic and political advances by African
Americans. 192 The pattern is evident in North Carolina’s racialized application of
court-sanctioned and extralegal executions as well as in other instances of mass
political violence. As discussed below, that pattern began in the colonial period
and developed in an economy dependent on low-cost labor.
B. From Slave Codes to the Wilmington Massacre
Of the nearly 800 judicially sanctioned executions carried out in North
Carolina’s first 235 years as a colony and a state, more than 70% targeted African
Americans; during the same period, three whites were executed for crimes against
African Americans. 193 Aggravated forms of execution, including burning at the
stake, were reserved for “petit treason”—the uniquely threatening offenses of slave
revolt and husband killing. 194 The imbalanced application of capital punishment
was so profound and long-standing that even after the advent of the electric chair,
Novel Relationships in the New System of Campaign Finance, 3 J.L. & POL. 423, 433
(1987).
191
Broder, supra note 189; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 187, at 269 (describing
Helms’s nationally televised response to the phoned-in suggestion that he receive “a Nobel
Peace Prize for everything [he had] done to help keep down the niggers”); Linda Chavez,
Race to the Finish: The Supreme Court and the FCC’s Racial Preference Program, 44
ARK. L. REV. 1097, 1104–05 (1991) (attributing a racially charged campaign
advertisement’s effectiveness in part to the opposing candidate’s self-dealing use of
Federal Communications Commission affirmative action policies); Earl Sheridan, Book
Review, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 515, 517 (2008) (reviewing Mark A. Smith, THE RIGHT TALK:
HOW CONSERVATIVES TRANSFORMED THE GREAT SOCIETY INTO THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY
(2007) and describing famous “white hands” television advertisement from the 1990 Helms
Senate campaign); Jesse Helms “Hands” Ad, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=KIyewCdXMzk (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (video of “white hands” campaign
advertisement).
192
JAMES BALDWIN, My Dungeon Shook: Letter to My Nephew on the OneHundredth Anniversary of the Emancipation, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED
NONFICTION 1948–1985, at 336 (1985) (“[T]he black man has functioned in the white
man’s world as a fixed star, as an immovable pillar: and as he moves out of his place,
heaven and earth are shaken to their foundations.”).
193
Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle
with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2038–39,
2043–49, 2053–56 (2010).
194
Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical
Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 103–04 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
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one white man slit his own throat instead of becoming “the first white man
electrocuted in North Carolina.” 195
In the antebellum era, Gabriel’s uprising, Nat Turner’s rebellion, and the
circulation of David Walker’s revolutionary Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the
World led to slave-owner hysteria. 196 Tortured slaves “confessed” to plotting
rebellion. Some were burned at the stake or beheaded. The decapitated heads were
mounted on stakes to inspire terror and submission. 197 The state legislature soon
stripped free blacks of voting rights. 198 Additional new laws forbade slaves and
free blacks from preaching, teaching, or public speaking in any forum. 199 Teaching
literacy to African Americans became a crime. 200
Reactionary violence also marred Reconstruction. For example, freed blacks
and whites formed Union Leagues in the pursuit of political and economic selfeducation and advocacy (as well as in self-defense). 201 Ku Klux Klan thuggery
soon eliminated that cooperation. 202 Despite such violent suppression, in the 1870s,
while other Southern states fell to Redemptionist takeovers, North Carolina
retained a Republican governor and rejected a revanchist white-supremacist
constitution. 203
Then, in 1892 and 1894, low-income farm workers and other rural white
Populists joined with black and white Republicans to take the governor’s mansion,
the state legislature, and several local governmental councils, commissions, and
appointed positions from Democrats. 204 These Fusionists sought to increase “the
liberty of the laboring people, both white and black.” 205 They “capped interest rates
on personal debt, increased expenditures for public education, shifted the weight of
taxation from individuals to corporations and railroads, and made generous
appropriations to state charitable and correctional institutions.” 206 They also
expanded voting rights and local democracy, instituting city and county elections
in place of legislatively appointed authorities. 207
195

Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 193, at 2039 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 2043–56 (examining the history of race and executions in North Carolina).
196
Stephen Kantrowitz, The Two Faces of Domination in North Carolina, 1800–
1898, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 97–102.
197
DAVID S. CECELSKI, THE WATERMAN’S SONG: SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN
MARITIME NORTH CAROLINA 53–54 (2001).
198
TIMOTHY B. TYSON, BLOOD DONE SIGN MY NAME 132 (2004).
199
Id.
200
See id.; see also N.C. Sch. for the Deaf & Dumb v. N.C. Inst. for the Deaf, Dumb
& Blind, 23 S.E. 171, 172 (N.C. 1895).
201
See TYSON, supra note 198, at 282–85; FONER, supra note 183, at 283–84 (citing
the North Carolina Union League chapter as exemplifying the “remarkable degree of
interracial harmony” that existed within some local leagues).
202
FONER, supra note 183, at 344, 427–31 (describing reports from one North
Carolina judicial district of murders, rapes, arson, and hundreds of beatings in anti-Union
League violence).
203
Id. at 444.
204
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 11–12.
205
Id. at 12.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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This “historic experiment in interracial democracy” came to an abrupt and
violent end with the Wilmington massacre of 1898. 208 Part of a statewide and
national white-supremacy movement, the 1898 revolution shackled the state with
decades of Jim Crow rule. 209 At the time, Wilmington was North Carolina’s largest
city and had an active and prosperous black majority. 210 Wilmington was also a
Fusionist stronghold. But the depression of 1893 and blacks’ growing political and
economic success stoked white resentment. 211
Local whites plotted a violent resurgence. 212 Like their counterparts across the
state and nation, they drew on nascent theories of social Darwinism and scientific
racism to insist that “North Carolina is a white man’s state, and white men will rule
it . . . .” 213 The media added fuel to the fire. In the run-up to the 1898 elections,
newspapers put racist cartoons on the front page. Examples include a black
vampire labeled “NEGRO RULE” emerging from a Fusionist ballot box to ensnare
fleeing white victims in fearsome claws: 214

On the eve of the 1898 election, Alfred C. Waddell, a former U.S.
congressman, incited murder: “You are Anglo-Saxons. . . . You are armed and
208

Cecelski & Tyson, supra note 46, at xiv.
Id. at xiv–xv.
210
WILMINGTON REPORT, supra note 104, at 35, 46–52; Michael Honey, Class, Race,
and Power in the New South: Racial Violence and the Delusions of White Supremacy, in
DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 174.
211
See WILMINGTON REPORT, supra note 104, at 52.
212
Id. at 52–53.
213
Raymond Gavins, Fear, Hope, and Struggle: Recasting Black North Carolina in
the Age of Jim Crow, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 188.
214
Election 1898 Political Cartoons in the News & Observer, UNIV. OF N.C., http://
www2.lib.unc.edu/ncc/1898/sources/cartoons/0927.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (image
entitled The Vampire That Hovers Over North Carolina); see also id. (images entitled
Remember! and A Warning. Get Back! We Will not Stand It).
209
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prepared . . . . [I]f you find the negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if
he refuses, kill him.” 215 Across the state, the Klan and the Red Shirts—organized
gangs of working-class whites—used rifles and shotguns to turn the election. 216
The Wilmington faction issued a “White Declaration of Independence,” destroyed
the local black newspaper, and began killing “every damn nigger in sight.”
Estimated death tolls range from 9 to 300 or more. 217 All elected Fusionist leaders
were forced to resign at gunpoint, marched to the train station, and banished from
the city. 218 Local Christian pastors praised the homicidal violence as “God’s
service” 219 and “a mere incident,” reasoning that “[y]ou cannot make an omelet
without breaking an egg.” 220
C. Resurgent White Supremacy
With the Democrat white-supremacist takeover complete, statewide
regulations soon disenfranchised blacks, barred them from jury service, and
replaced previously common patterns of integrated housing with systematic
apartheid that “thoroughly ‘sorted’ along lines of race and class.” 221 Support for
black schools dropped from parity to fifty-four cents on the dollar. 222 A key
booster of the Red Shirt revolution, Raleigh News & Observer publisher Josephus
Daniels, celebrated such developments as “permanent good government by the
party of the White Man.” 223 The new governor, Charles Brantley Aycock,
explained that the rule of law required the “white man’s party . . . [to] disfranchise
the negro . . . while we work out the industrial, commercial, intellectual and moral
development of the State.” 224
That working out has taken some time. Half a century later, black veterans of
World War II came home intent on a “double-V” campaign to defeat oppression at

215
Glenda E. Gilmore, Murder, Memory, and the Flight of the Incubus, in
DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 84–85.
216
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1606–07 (1994).
217
Timothy B. Tyson, The Ghosts of 1898: Wilmington’s Race Riot and the Rise of
White Supremacy, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 17, 2006, at 1A.
218
Id.
219
Id. (quoting the Reverend J.W. Kramer).
220
John Haley, Race, Rhetoric, and Revolution, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra
note 46, at 209 (quoting Reverend Calvin S. Blackwell of Wilmington’s First Baptist
Church).
221
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 17; Gavins, supra note 213, at 190–91.
222
STEWART E. TOLNAY & E. M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882–1930, at 84–85 n.57 (1995); KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra
note 188, at 16.
223
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 76
(1974); see also JOHN HALEY, CHARLES N. HUNTER AND RACE RELATIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA 214–15, 284 (George B. Tindall et al. eds., 1987).
224
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 14–15.
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home as well as overseas. 225 As race riots exploded in other cities, Governor J.
Melville Broughton warned against protests linked to racial integration. He chose
an auspicious site to give his speech. At the mouth of the Cape Fear River in
Wilmington—the same river that Red Shirt revolutionary Alfred Waddell had
threatened to choke with black bodies—the governor reminded the crowd that
“blood flowed freely in the streets of this city” in 1898 and might again if
“agitators” did not cease efforts whose “ultimate conclusion would result only in a
mongrel race.” 226
Similar threatening references to the violent anti-Fusionist rebellion tainted
North Carolina’s hotly contested Democratic primary race for the Senate in 1950.
Willis Smith’s supporters attacked “bloc voting” (i.e., black voting) for incumbent
Frank Porter Graham as a repeat of “THEIR REIGN not so many years ago” and
as the looming return of “carpet-bag rule.” 227 Other flyers screamed, “WHITE
PEOPLE WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE,” warning that a vote for Graham
was a vote for “Northern political labor leaders” and “mingling of the races,” with
blacks working in the same factories, eating in the same restaurants, riding the
same public transit, studying in the same schools, and sleeping in hotels and
hospitals “with you, your wife and daughters.” 228
The civil rights era saw continued hardening of political rhetoric and action in
North Carolina as in other parts of the nation. In the 1960 gubernatorial race, the
campaign of segregationist candidate Beverly Lake vowed not to “sit idly by . . .
and let the NAACP and other evil outside influences make a mockery of North
Carolina . . . [and] our way of life.” 229
By 1965, North Carolina had more Klan activity than any other state, with a
larger dues-paying membership than Alabama and Mississippi combined. 230 North
Carolina’s Klan has remained active in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. In the 1980s, fifteen robed Klansmen gathered outside a county jail to
225

Id. at 22; see also Kari Frederickson, World War II, White Violence, and Black
Politics in V.O. Key Jr.’s Southern Politics, in UNLOCKING KEY, supra note 178, at 39–46
(discussing how World War II was a critical event in the origins of the black freedom
struggle).
226
Timothy B. Tyson, Wars for Democracy: African American Militancy and
Interracial Violence in North Carolina During World War II, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED,
supra note 46, at 253–54.
227
Jonathan Gentry, All That’s Not Fit to Print: Anticommunist and White
Supremacist Campaign Literature in the 1950 North Carolina Democratic Senate Primary,
82 N.C. HIST. REV. 33, 48–49 (2005) (emphasis in original).
228
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 26 (emphasis in original). In turn, flyers
supporting Graham warned that Smith’s election would return white workers to twelvehour days at pennies per hour and lead to reinstitution of child labor. Id. at 27; see also
Gavin Wright, Cheap Labor and Southern Textiles, 1880–1930, 96 Q. J. ECON. 605, 609–
611 tbls.I, II & III (1981) (documenting use of child labor in North Carolina textile mills
between 1880 and 1920); id. at 607, 626–29 (attributing industry decline to “dramatic
increase in real wage costs” with decline of child labor).
229
Gene R. Nichol, Bill Aycock and the North Carolina Speaker Ban Law, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1725, 1727–28 (2001).
230
GREENSBORO TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 101 (2006),
available at http://www.greensborotrc.org/pre1979_kkk.pdf.
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offer the $50,000 bond for a black man charged with raping a white victim. 231 A
local pastor spoke out publicly against the Klan. 232 A cross was burned on his
lawn, and nineteen shots were fired into the home where he and his family were
sleeping. 233 When Klansmen killed five anti-Klan protesters in Greensboro, allwhite juries acquitted the charged defendants.234 More recent strange fruit includes
an Imperial Wizard’s May 2012 homage to “white unity” at a cross-burning and
new-member induction ceremony near the small town of Harmony, North
Carolina. 235
Of course, such conduct is not confined to North Carolina, 236 nor to the
South. 237 But it was one of North Carolina’s Supreme Court justices who observed
during lynching’s twentieth-century heyday that “the Lynch law of our country has
a very ancient and respectable pedigree.” 238 In the same era, the state’s chief
justice expressly and repeatedly urged speedier judicially sanctioned executions as
a cure for lynching. 239 At the time, North Carolina tracked trends around the
231

Ashley Halsey, In N.C., the Klan’s Cry of ‘White Power’ is Growing Louder,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 1984, at A1.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
GREENSBORO TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
FINAL REPORT 2, http://www.greensborotrc.org/exec_summary.pdf. In contrast, a few years
later capital juries spared two white defendants from the death penalty despite their openly
racist crimes of hunting down and executing a black couple to earn coveted spider tattoos.
Second Ex-Paratrooper Gets Life in North Carolina Racial Killings, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1997, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/13/us/second-ex-paratroopergets-life-in-north-carolina-racial-killings.html?ref=michael_james.
235
KKK Hold Rally in NC Town of 600, WFMY NEWS (May 27, 2012, 8:02 AM),
http://www.digtriad.com/news/watercooler/article/230081/176/KKK-Hold-Rally-In-NC-To
wn-Of-600 [hereafter KKK Hold Rally]; cf. STRANGE FRUIT (California Newsreel 2002)
(linking history of lynchings with Klan rallies in the writing and popularization of jazz
classic).
236
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 349 (2003) (discussing incidents of cross
burning and defendants’ threats to “take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks”
(alteration in original)).
237
See, e.g., Kathy Lynn Gray, Man Gets 30 Days for Burning Cross, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (June 22, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/
06/22/man-gets-30-days-for-burning-cross.html (discussing federal sentencing for Ohio
cross burning).
238
State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 610 (N.C. 1906) (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting “[a]
most interesting writer in the American Law Register, Mr. John Marshall Gest”). Justice
Brown would have affirmed the trial court’s quashing of the indictment on the basis that
lynching was neither a common-law nor a statutorily defined offense. Id. at 610–11.
239
E.g., State v. Neville, 95 S.E. 55, 59 (N.C. 1918); State v. Cameron, 81 S.E. 748,
751 (N.C. 1914); State v. Cole, 44 S.E. 391, 397, 399 (N.C. 1903) (Clark, C.J., dissenting);
State v. Rhyne, 33 S.E. 128, 135–36 (N.C. 1899) (Clark, C.J. dissenting); see also Walter
Clark, True Remedy for Lynch Law, 28 AM. L. REV. 801, 806 (1894) (“To have [a
deterrent] effect the punishment must be prompt and certain whenever guilt is clear beyond
all reasonable doubt. This principle which is so often ignored by the courts is the one which
instinctively actuates lynching mobs.”). But see Neville, 95 S.E. at 60 (Brown, Walker,
Hoke, and Allen, JJ., concurring) (finding “no unreasonable delay” in processing North
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country in that nearly 90% of the state’s 168 recorded lynchings between 1865 and
1941 victimized blacks, 240 with at least twenty-five black men lynched between
1900 and 1918 alone. 241 In North Carolina, as elsewhere, the line separating courtsanctioned executions from extralegal vigilantism often blurred. 242
D. Race, Class, Labor, and the War on Poverty
North Carolina’s racially imbalanced application of state-sanctioned and
private violence devolved in an economy dependent on low-cost labor. After the
1898 white supremacist revolution, the state’s textile and tobacco industries began
a period of explosive growth. Most nonfactory workers were sharecroppers. 243
And, as reflected in the “WHITE PEOPLE WAKE UP” flyer, factory work was
considered “whites only” for decades, particularly in the textile industry. 244
The tobacco industry was integrated, but shop foremen were white and the
dirtiest work was reserved for African American employees. Black tobacco
workers engaged in significant union organizing; ensuing self-education projects
and voter drives shifted the balance in some local elections. Occasionally there was
some interracial cooperation within and across these movements. 245
Carolina’s criminal cases and claiming that “there are few, if any, states in the Union where
they are more rapidly disposed of.”); Cameron, 81 S.E. at 752 (Allen, Walker, Brown, and
Hoke, JJ., concurring) (discounting allegations of delayed justice); Joseph Edwin Proffit,
Lynching: Its Cause and Cure, 7 YALE L.J. 264, 264–67 (1898) (criticizing the idea that
expedient justice requires mob rule). Chief Justice Clark’s concerns about delay were not
idiosyncratic; decades later, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist also promoted courtordered executions as a bulwark against “anarchy . . . self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch
law.” Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 961 (1981) (Rehnquist, J, dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240
VANN R. NEWKIRK, LYNCHING IN NORTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY, 1865–1941, app.
II at 167–70 (2009).
241
Raymond Gavins, The NAACP in North Carolina During the Age of Segregation,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS STUDIES 105, 106–07 (Armstead L. Robinson &
Patricia Sullivan eds., 1991) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].
242
See generally State v. Newsome, 143 S.E. 187 (N.C. 1928); JAMES ELBERT
CUTLER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED
STATES 264 (1905) (describing a coroner’s condoning of lynching as the act of “good
citizens” defending their “homes, wives [and] daughters”). Much constitutional criminal
procedure developed along the boundary between legal and extralegal violence, typically in
racially charged cases with low-income defendants. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 281–85, 287 (1936) (vacating black defendants’ capital murder convictions in the
“so-called trial” after confessions were obtained through partial lynching and whippings);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49–52, 72–73 (1932) (finding that the denial of counsel
violated due process in one-day capital trials of black males charged with raping white
women in the context of “tense, hostile and excited public sentiment”).
243
See, e.g., KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 100–01.
244
Id. at 17.
245
See id. at 22; HERBERT J. LAHNE, THE COTTON MILL WORKER 233–34 (1944)
(discussing the Communist-backed National Textile Workers Union making “no
concessions to Southern prejudice on race”); Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein,
Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75
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But labor organizing hit the skids repeatedly in North Carolina. Milder unionbusting tactics in 1900 included owners closing mills, company stores, and housing
to union members. Workers were blacklisted and their families left homeless,
without “provisions [or] contact with the outside world, for the post office was in
the company store.” 246 In 1929, strikes were crushed in violent melees that led to
criminal convictions of union workers and nolle prosequi decisions or acquittals
for those accused of attacking or killing strikers. 247 The latter group of defendants
often comprised local sheriffs’ deputies or state National Guardsmen. 248
That antiunion fervor was formalized in 1947, as North Carolina pioneered
“right to work” statutes that criminalized “closed shop” agreements between
business and labor. 249 In 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court gave those laws a
constitutional stamp of approval. 250 Thereafter the Congress of Industrial
Organizations mounted an aggressive seven-year organizing campaign called
“Operation Dixie”—but deliberately retreated from previously active recruitment
across racial lines. Ultimately antiunion regulations, the segregated workforce,
tensions between the black laboring and middle classes, and the real and imaginary
links between unions and the Communist Party combined to hinder the
development of organized labor in North Carolina. 251
The War on Poverty hit similar walls in the 1960s. As in the earlier
Progressive and Fusion eras, there was some significant cooperation across color
lines. Striking examples of such cooperation include the actions of Klan leaders
Lloyd Jacobs and C.P. Ellis. Jacobs, an ex-convict, recruited NAACP members,
student activists, and low-income people to join him in protesting prison
conditions through an organization called the North Carolina Justice Committee. 252
Ellis was a vocal opponent of school integration, the civil rights movement, and
War on Poverty efforts to aid blacks. He was astonished to be elected cochair of a
community council responsible for creating a school desegregation plan—
particularly because he shared the role with black activist Ann Atwater. Until then,
Ellis and Atwater had only “cussed each other, bawled each other, [and] hated each

J. AM. HIST. 786, 788–93 (1988) (discussing union drive by black workers in WinstonSalem).
246
LAHNE, supra note 245, at 186–87.
247
Id. at 216–21.
248
Id. at 216–21, 227, 230–31.
249
H.B. 229, 1947 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1947) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (2011)).
250
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 527–29 nn.1–3,
537 (1949) (affirming State v. Whitaker, 45 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1947)).
251
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 28–29, 168–69; see also LAHNE, supra
note 245, at 216–21 (discussing violence against Communist-backed and non-Communist
union workers and organizers); Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care
of Itself”: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1422–27 (2005) (discussing the NAACP’s waxing and waning
interests in the black labor movement); Korstad & Lichtenstein, supra note 245, at 801–06
(discussing class tensions and the role of NAACP and Urban League in the rise and fall of
union drive by black workers in Winston-Salem).
252
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 315–16.
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other.” 253 But when forced into a working relationship with Atwater, Ellis found “a
whole world was opening up” and that he “was learning new truths that [he] had
never learned before.” 254 Among other things, he realized that structural
disadvantages “shut out” low-income people of all races from economic and
political opportunity. 255
But such interracial, intraclass cooperation remained rare and evanescent, as
were attempts to fulfill demands for maximum feasible participation (MFP) by
low-income people in designing and overseeing poverty-reduction programs.
Congress incorporated MFP requirements into legislation such as the Economic
Opportunity Act (EOA) and the Model Cities Act. 256 The MFP mandate was
modeled on the North Carolina Fund (the “Fund”). This novel approach to
antipoverty advocacy was initially supported by state and national philanthropic
foundations. Only later, after the EOA was crafted to follow the Fund’s model, did
the Fund distribute federal dollars. 257
Professor Tara Melish focuses blame for the demise of the EOA’s MFP
mandate—and for much of the antipathy toward the War on Poverty—on the
“increasingly belligerent, extreme, and confrontational demands” of welfare rights
activists for resource redistribution. 258 Professors Robert R. Korstad and James L.
Leloudis describe a more complex set of tensions at work in North Carolina. Their
research shows that MFP drew consistent fire from the outset as white
supremacists, farm and business owners, local governments, and nonprofits—with
varied motives—resisted the mandate, finding it a direct challenge to their power
and authority. 259
Such reactions, as well as the Fund’s deliberately limited time span, cabined
antipoverty and racial justice work in North Carolina. The movements took another
hit when new federal tax laws restricted philanthropic foundations from supporting
work that could be construed as political (including education and organization
involving voter registration drives) and made the restrictions enforceable through
large monetary fines against not only the foundations but also their employees and
board members. 260 The triple whammy landed with elimination, reallocation, and
privatization of governmental support programs for poor people in the 1990s. 261
Thus, even before the 2008 recession, North Carolina consistently ranked
among the lowest ten states, near Texas and Mississippi, for per-pupil spending on
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Id. at 317.
Id. at 317–18.
255
Id. at 316–18.
256
Id. at 166–67, 306, 340–41.
257
Id. at 82–92, 166–67, 172–73.
258
Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance,
New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 59–68 (2010).
259
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 172–73.
260
Id. at 328–35.
261
Id. at 252–53; see also Bach, Governance, supra note 92, at 243–50 (describing
effects of 1996 federal welfare reform that limited welfare assistance, and discussing some
responsive poverty-reduction efforts).
254
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public education. 262 Conversely, the state ranked sixteenth and fourteenth for
highest overall and child-poverty rates, respectively, among the states.263 These
rates spike in several urban and rural areas and are sharply skewed by race and
ethnicity. 264 For example, the median net worth of minority to white households in
the state is fourteen cents on the dollar.265 To translate these numbers into the civil
legal setting, approximately 80% of the low-income population that is eligible for
and in need of legal services has no access to an attorney. 266 The state ranks
thirtieth in support for civil legal services; Florida invests twice as much and
Maryland three times as much in services per eligible client.267 As another point of
comparison, while there is one attorney for every 442 North Carolinians, the legal
aid attorney-client ratio is one to 15,500. 268
In addition, conservative populism retains deep and vibrant roots in North
Carolina. Recent developments are typical of national trends. In 2010, millions of
dollars from inside and outside the state were targeted to seat the first Republicanmajority North Carolina General Assembly since Reconstruction. 269 The state
legislature promptly began to cut taxes and spending, 270 and enacted what one
expert called “the largest and most restrictive” cluster of voting regulations since
passage of the federal Voting Rights Act fifty years ago. 271 Those initiatives track

262

Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2008, at 8 tbl.8
(2010) (showing only six states with less per-pupil spending), available at http://www2.
census.gov/govs/school/08f33pub.pdf, with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION
FINANCES: 2010, at 8 tbl.8 (2012) (same), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school
/10f33pub.pdf.
263
GENE NICHOL & HEATHER HUNT, CTR. ON POVERTY, WORK, AND OPPORTUNITY,
UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, DOCUMENTING POVERTY, ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND
CHALLENGE IN NORTH CAROLINA: A REPORT FOR THE Z. SMITH REYNOLDS FOUNDATION
11 (2010), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/publications/documenti
ngpoverty_finalreport.pdf.
264
Id. at 11–14.
265
Id. at 14.
266
N.C. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, INITIAL REPORT 8 (2008), available at
http://www.ncequalaccesstojustice.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/fullsummitreport.pdf.
267
Id. at 14.
268
Id. at 22.
269
See Final REDMAP Report, REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Dec. 21, 2010,
2:54 AM), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/?p=638 (citing new “control” of
state legislatures as the greatest partisan success “in modern history”); cf. Jane Mayer, State
for Sale: A Conservative Multimillionaire Has Taken Control in North Carolina, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/10/111010fa
_fact_mayer (detailing strategies behind political victories in 2010 in North Carolina).
270
See, e.g., Dan Kane, A New Loophole For Businesses Will Cost State $336 Million
a Year, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (June 3, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/0
6/03/2105416/a-new-loophole-for-businesses.html (finding that tax breaks for businesses
equaled salaries and benefits for 6,400 laid-off state employees, including 900 teachers).
271
Michael Gordon, Fight Over NC’s Voting Laws: Is it Race, or Is It Politics?,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 19, 2013), available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2
013/10/19/3296978/voting-fight-is-it-race-or-is.html (discussing complaint filed in United
States v. State of North Carolina, No. 13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013), available at
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legal and political shifts occurring across the country. 272 As discussed below, the
initiatives include resurgent “tough on crime” rhetoric and legislation that threatens
North Carolina’s improbable role as a criminal justice reform pioneer.
IV. REFORM, REACTION, AND RESILIENCE: AN UNLIKELY CONSTELLATION OF
CUTTING-EDGE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS
North Carolina’s complex and often violent history makes the state a
surprising site for cutting-edge criminal justice reforms, which this Part sorts into
three categories. The first involves “innocentric” efforts to identify and reduce
wrongful convictions. The second targets efficiency and cost reduction. These
reforms are laudatory. Several directly redress power disparities that undermine
system fairness, reliability, and legitimacy. But it is the third category of reform
that more directly addresses the democracy deficit at the intersection of crime,
race, and poverty.
This category includes early intervention programs such as Nurse-Family
Partnership (NFP) programs, which are designed at least in part to increase
capacities for resilience and self-governance and to reduce criminal offending and
victimization. Within the machinery of the criminal justice systems, two examples
are North Carolina’s Indigent Defense Services system and the state’s Racial
Justice Act. The former strengthens a defendant’s role and voice in case
processing, and the latter vindicated the rights of black jurors to participate in
capital cases.
The foregoing categorization of North Carolina’s reforms is not hard and fast;
motivations for these reforms overlap and vary. Their abilities to withstand
reaction and repeal are also mixed.
A. Innocentric Reforms
As indicated in the Introduction, the experiences of Inhofe and Stevens are
linked to Thompson’s by a single factor: the need of an accused to access the
prosecuting authority’s investigative file in order to mount a full and fair defense.
Prior scholarship describes North Carolina’s pioneering full open-file discovery
reform. 273 That reform is a broadly democracy-enhancing tool. As Inhofe realized
when “it happened to [him],” 274 access to that information helps to level the
playing field between a defendant and the concentrated power of a charging and
prosecuting authority.
Full open-file discovery cannot compensate for prosecutors’ superior
investigative resources and ability to select the number and level of charges against
a particular defendant. But access to the full investigative file can empower
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncm/news/2013/20130930_US_v_NC.pdf, which challenges
voting restrictions imposed by, for example, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§163 to 166.13-14 (2013)).
272
See WENDY WEISER & DIANA KASDAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING
LAW CHANGES: ELECTION UPDATE 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voting_Law_Changes_Election_Update.pdf.
273
See Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–86.
274
Lowy, supra note 1.
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defendants to exercise a greater level of autonomy. A defendant’s decision to enter
a plea or exercise the right to trial is more likely to be fully informed and voluntary
when the defendant knows the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case. In the
minority of cases that go to trial, full open-file discovery helps to ensure that the
defendant’s voice is heard through the full and fair airing of the evidence. Fact
finders, who speak for the community either as elected judges in bench trials or as
jurors exercising a quintessentially democratic check on concentrated government
power, are likewise more fully able to undertake deliberations with confidence and
issue reliable judgments. Thus, discovery reform enhances democracy while
simultaneously promoting efficiency and finality of case processing and
verdicts. 275
Full open-file discovery also spun off additional pioneering reforms in North
Carolina. Newly opened prosecution files revealed still more wrongful convictions
in a number of high-profile cases. 276 Two types of responsive innocentric reforms
bolstered full open-file mandates by seeking to prevent erroneous convictions.
First, the state pioneered the creation of an independent Innocence Inquiry
Commission to investigate and correct wrongful convictions. 277 Second, North
Carolina joined the minority of states undertaking reform of forensic investigation
procedures.
1. The Innocence Commission
North Carolina’s Innocence Inquiry Commission (IIC) is the only state
agency in the country with the authority to refer prisoners with colorable innocence
claims to court for potential exoneration and release. 278 As was the case with
mandatory statewide full open-file discovery reform, implementation of the new
IIC statutes led to another spate of high-profile exonerations. 279
There also was predictable pushback. Prosecutors unsuccessfully sought to
bar IIC claims by prisoners who plead guilty or no contest, to restrict sources of
IIC referrals, to expand prosecutors’ adversarial participation in IIC proceedings,
and to trim witness immunity protections.280 The legislature rejected these
275

See Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–72, 1377.
Id. at 1379 & n.360.
277
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1460
to -1475 (2011); see also Robert J. Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”:
Evaluating State Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1301, 1355
tbl.5 (2011) (listing jurisdictions with innocence commissions and their dates of
establishment).
278
Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 687, 734
(2010).
279
David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1049–53 (2010). The Commission received more than 1,300 claims
from its inception in 2007 through April 2013 and closed 1,113 cases, leading to the release
of four prisoners based on clear and convincing evidence of innocence. See NC Innocence
Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, http://www.innoc
encecommission-nc.gov/stats.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
280
H.B. 778, §§ 1–4, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (as referred to
Judiciary Subcomm. B, Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bil
276
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proposals, but agreed to eliminate the IIC’s discretion to exclude from its
proceedings any crime victim whose presence “may interfere with the
investigation[.]” 281 The legislature also restricted state compensation to IICexonerated prisoners who plead not guilty or no contest. 282
Theoretically, these amendments marginally enhance individual voices vis-àvis concentrated authority. Their practical effect is open to question. The first
amendment helps to guarantee victims a place at the table. Increased transparency
improves procedural justice. New information can change victims’ perceptions
about defendants’ guilt. 283 But victims who are not called as witnesses or otherwise
engaged by the IIC’s investigation and review process may be frustrated by the
real or perceived inability to shape the outcome. This limitation is driven by the
uniquely nonadversarial structure of the IIC’s investigative and first-tier decisionmaking processes. 284
With respect to the second amendment, some defendants might strengthen
either a pretrial innocence claim or plea bargaining position by pointing to the
compensation exclusion as warranting concessions from the prosecution. But given
the institutional pressures facing charged defendants, 285 including pressures on
overloaded defense attorneys, 286 it is unlikely that many defendants will know that
this exclusion is an automatic collateral consequence of any guilty plea. It is more
likely that the exclusion will operate as intended: as completely barring
compensation for anyone who pleads guilty but whom the IIC reveals to be a
victim of wrongful imprisonment. Thus, the amendment exacerbates the power
disparities that drive the plea process and yield wrongful convictions in the first
place.

ls/House/PDF/H778v1.pdf. The original statute allowed adversarial hearings before a
three-judge panel in the multitiered process. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(c–d) (2011). The
proposed amendment would have expanded that authority to earlier stages in the process.
H.B. 778, § 3, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011).
281
H.B. 778, § 6, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1468(b) (2011)); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(c) (2011) (“If a formal
inquiry regarding a claim of factual innocence is granted, the Director shall use all due
diligence to notify the victim in the case and explain the inquiry process. The Commission
shall give the victim notice that the victim has the right to present his or her views and
concerns throughout the Commission’s investigation.”).
282
H.B. 778, § 11 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 148-82(b) (2011)). It is unclear whether this amendment trumps the eligibility of
any wrongfully imprisoned individual to seek state compensation after obtaining a
gubernatorial pardon of innocence. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82(a) (2013).
283
See generally JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR
MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009) (discussing the experiences of a rape
victim and the defendant, who was wrongfully convicted because of the victim’s mistaken
eyewitness identification, but later exonerated).
284
See Wolitz, supra note 279, at 1051–52.
285
See Bibas, supra note 70, at 960–62.
286
Moore, supra note 13, at 1026, 1058–62.
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2. Forensic Science Reforms
Mounting evidence of wrongful convictions and exonerations also led the
General Assembly to mandate improvements in eyewitness identification
procedures that have been cited as the nation’s “most comprehensive.” 287
Addressing other predictable sources of error, the state mandated recordation of
interrogations in felony cases, 288 along with the preservation of biological evidence
for future testing. 289
In 2011, North Carolina also joined a minority of states in reforming
procedures governing its forensic science laboratory. 290 This reform followed a
chilling indictment of national forensic capabilities by the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), which stated that
the existing legal regime—including the rules governing the
admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards governing
appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the adversary
process, and judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific expertise
necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence—is inadequate
to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science
disciplines. 291
In addition to the NAS critique, North Carolina’s Innocence Commission
proceedings and other litigation revealed flaws in the qualifications, evaluations,
and testimony of State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) forensic sciences staff.
Among other things, previously unknown records demonstrated that SBI
employees had provided biased or false testimony favoring the prosecution. 292
Responsive legislation created an independent state-oversight authority and
specified qualification and evaluation standards to increase transparency and
accountability. 293 The full open-file discovery statutes were amended to
specifically require disclosure not only of forensic test results but also of all
underlying or preliminary notes and results. 294 Legislators also created the position
of forensic science ombudsman, tasked to work with all stakeholders including
“the general public to ensure all processes, procedures, practices, and protocols at
the State Crime Laboratory are consistent with State and federal law, best forensic
law practices, and in the best interests of justice in this State.”295
287

Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1318.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211 (2011); see also Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1330–
41 (discussing varying recordation requirements in the nineteen states that regulate
interrogation).
289
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268 (2011).
290
Id. § 114-16.1.
291
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 85 (2009).
292
Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1321–22.
293
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-16.1 (2011).
294
Id. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2011).
295
Id. § 114-16.2. The state Indigent Defense Services agency also created a Forensic
Resource Counsel position to help defenders “understand[] and . . . challeng[e] the forensic
288
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Despite demonstrated and systemic flaws in the SBI’s forensic analysis
department, North Carolina did not follow other states in creating an independent
watchdog. 296 Instead, after passage of this reform legislation, a retired judge was
appointed to clean house at the SBI lab. 297 An outside auditor tested all forensic
workers for whom accreditation methods existed to determine their competence. 298
A number failed those tests. 299
Significantly, prosecutors recognized this news as impeachment information,
which they had a duty to provide to the defense under Brady and the state’s full
open-file discovery statutes. To the astonishment of many, the former judge in
charge of the SBI’s reformation refused to give prosecutors the test results of
individual forensic examiners. 300 Instead of complying with Brady, the judge
insisted that the information was protected by a personnel records exception. 301
The prosecutors subpoenaed the information, and the SBI was forced to reveal
it. 302
That remarkable turn in North Carolina’s innocentric reforms may illustrate
the long-term power of litigation and legislation to change the internal culture of
prosecutorial offices. 303 These reforms also enhance democracy at the most
granular level. They check government power, reduce opportunities for intentional
and unintentional biasing of investigations toward the prosecution, and help level
the playing field for an individual who is subject to a charge or investigation.
science evidence” by providing a database of information about forensic experts as well as
training programs, research updates, and “other resources to support litigation.” See
Forensic Resources, N.C. INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., http://www.ncids.com/forensic/ (last
visited Apr. 3, 2014).
296
See Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1321–27, 1327 tbl.2; cf. Kami Chavis
Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal
Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 531–33
(2008) (citing Cincinnati’s collaborative agreement as a model for participatory
governance, oversight, and reform of policing).
297
North Carolina Department of Justice, Permanent Director Named for State Crime
Lab (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/56afaa4b-24e2-4b7a-a10a-552e36a92e13
/Permanent-director-named-for-State-Crime-Lab.aspx; Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, SBI
Fights District Attorneys’ Attempts to Learn About Failed Tests, RALEIGH NEWS &
OBSERVER (June 14, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/06/14/2137375/sbi-fightsdistrict-attorneys.html.
298
Locke & Neff, supra note 297.
299
Id.
300
Memorandum from Joseph John, Sr., on Forensic Scientist Certification to All
Elected Dist. Attorneys and Staff 3 (June 13, 2012), available at http://www.ncids.com/for
ensic/sbi/analyst_certification/2012-06-16_SBI_Memo.pdf [hereinafter June 13, 2012
Memo]; Memorandum from Joseph John, Sr., on Forensic Scientist Certification to All
Elected Dist. Attorneys and Staff (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.ncids.com/forens
ic/sbi/analyst_certification/2012-01-13_SBI_Memo.pdf [hereinafter January 13, 2012
Memo]; Motion for Release of SBI Testing Information (June 12, 2012), available at http://
www.ncids.com/forensic/sbi/analyst_certification/2012-06-12_State’s_Motion.pdf.
301
June 13, 2012 Memo, supra note 300; January 13, 2012 Memo, supra note 300.
302
See, e.g., In re Matter of the North Carolina State Crime Lab, No. 12CRS0031,
2012 WL 3062033, at *2–3 (June 14, 2012).
303
See Moore, supra note 13, at 1333.
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On the other hand, the wrongful conviction movement addresses only a tiny
percentage of criminal cases. 304 As discussed below, with respect to the majority of
cases involving guilty defendants, North Carolina also was early in creating a
sentencing commission now viewed as “the exemplar of smart political and
rational reform.” 305
B. Focusing on the Bottom Line
1. The Sentencing Commission and Justice Reinvestment
North Carolina’s sentencing commission is viewed as a model in part because
it has the largest and most diverse membership of any sentencing commission in
the country, ensuring that “[v]irtually every conceivable interest is represented.” 306
But the commission was not exemplary solely because of its structure. It was the
“linchpin” connecting penal politics with a fiscal bottom line. 307 By fulfilling a
legislative mandate to conduct impact analyses on pending legislation, the
commission helped to reduce the state’s incarceration rate from the highest in the
nation to near the national average. 308
As discussed in Part II.B.2, convergent interests around cost cutting carry
reformers only so far. In the 1980s, North Carolina faced significant increases in
prison and jail populations, with correspondingly grim budget implications. 309 The
commission did not stop North Carolina from riding the nationwide wave of
budget-busting “three strikes” mandatory sentences. 310 As a result, North Carolina
became one of seventeen states to participate in the Council of State Governments’
Justice Reinvestment initiative—again with predictably mixed results.
The original vision of justice reinvestment entailed redirection of money spent
on criminal cases and incarceration to rebuild “the schools, healthcare facilities,
parks, and public spaces [] of neighborhoods devastated by high levels of
304

Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1552–56 (2008).
Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 782–83 (2005).
306
Id. at 783.
307
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 59, at 243; see also Wright, Counting the Cost, supra
note 80.
308
Wright, Counting the Cost, supra note 80, at 39. A recent law review article
argued for fiscal impact statements but did not mention North Carolina’s exemplary role
among jurisdictions that have required such analyses for years. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond
Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 646–48
(2012) (citing the United Kingdom as exemplar).
309
On the contribution of the “nothing works” movement to increased incarceration
rates and longer sentences, see, for example, Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The
Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War on Prisoners,” 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 204–
14 (2010); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585,
593–96 (2009).
310
See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (approving
constitutionality of three-strikes sentencing); Robert Ward Shaw, Comment, The States,
Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental Shifts in Federalism, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1195, 1205–06
(2004).
305
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incarceration.” 311 But consistent with this grasstops-driven initiative in other states,
North Carolina’s reinvestment focused instead on expanding surveillance and
control of released prisoners through increased probation and parole oversight—
albeit with “evidence-based” risk assessment protocols driving the categorization
of people and programming. 312
2. Collateral Consequences
North Carolina is also one of a handful of states to tackle the jungle of
collateral consequences that block access to the jobs, housing, education, and
transportation that released prisoners need to reintegrate successfully into their
communities. 313 But the state has yet to follow the lead of other jurisdictions by
eliminating collateral consequences outright or “banning the box” to limit potential
employers’ access to applicants’ criminal histories. 314
Instead, North Carolina joined the very small group of states that grant
certificates of rehabilitation to people with convictions who meet specified criteria
that predict successful reentry. 315 The corresponding state law also has been cited
as a national model for limiting civil liability for employers who hire people with
criminal records, should that hiring decision cause future harm. 316 Both of these
mechanisms are viewed as reducing barriers to employment. Finally, the state is
one of only two in the country to have constructed a collateral consequences
database through which defendants and complaining witnesses as well as
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges can become fully aware of the collateral
costs and benefits of specific charges, plea offers, and sentences. 317
311

Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated Issues: A
Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283,
298 (2009).
312
Nancy LaVigne et al., Justice Reinvestment Initiative State Assessment Report,
URBAN INST. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 46 (2013) (documenting North Carolina’s nearly
quintupled investment in probation and parole resources relative to treatment). N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1343.2 (Supp. 2012); see also North Carolina Overview, JUSTICE CTR.,
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, http://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/nc/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014)
(describing how the Council of State Governments Justice Center worked with North
Carolina to develop the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011); cf. Fan, supra note 308, at 633–
34 (disclaiming “starry-eyed and egalitarian hope for reclamation of every soul” in favor of
“data-driven,” cost-effective, and “culturally conscious” selection of participants and
programs).
313
Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U.
COLO. L. REV. 715, 717–20, 724 (2012) (highlighting barriers and citing authorities).
314
See State Reforms Reducing Collateral Consequences for People with Criminal
Records: 2011–12 Legislative Round-Up, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (ACLU/Crossroad Bible
Inst./Sentencing Project, Nat’l Employment Law Project), Sept. 2012, at 2, available at htt
p://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2012/StateCollateralConsequencesLegislativeRoundupSept
2012.pdf?nocdn=1 [hereinafter Reducing Collateral Consequences].
315
Radice, supra note 313, at 723–24.
316
Reducing Collateral Consequences, supra note 314, at 6 (discussing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-173.5 (2011)).
317
See Joel M. Schumm, Padilla and the Future of the Defense Function, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 3–4, 13 (2011). For Ohio’s collateral consequences database, see
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C. Class, Race, and Reform: NFP, IDS, and RJA
1. Human Beings and Citizens: Isomoiria and Democracy Enhancement
The foregoing constellation of reforms addresses the mechanics of criminal
justice systems as traditionally conceived. A democracy-enhancing theory of
criminal law and procedure should address causal factors driving the
disproportionate representation of low-income and minority individuals in criminal
justice systems—whether as crime victims, offenders, or, as is too often the case,
individuals with dual victim/offender identities. Bannister traces the cradle-toprison pipeline that disproportionately funnels low-income African American
children, particularly boys, from low literacy levels in racially and
socioeconomically segregated early elementary school settings to dropping out in
middle or early high school, then into juvenile systems and on to contact with
criminal law and procedure as adults.318
Nobel Prize-winning economist and law professor James Heckman reports
that early intervention programs divert those pipelines by empowering families to
improve their own prenatal care, parenting and communication skills, health and
nutrition, and literacy. 319 Available data indicate that these programs reduce the
risk of offending while conserving increasingly scarce tax dollars.320 Conversely,

Civil Impacts of Criminal Convictions Under Ohio Law, CIVICC OHIO.ORG, http://opd.ohi
o.gov/civicc (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
318
See United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 628–45, 670–88 (E.D.N.Y.
2011); see also Hinds Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So. 3d 387,
411–12 (Miss. 2008) (Graves, J., dissenting) (discussing the “school-to-prison pipeline”
resulting from overzealous punishment of school-aged youth). For examples of the
abundant “pipeline” literature, see Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster,
Understanding the Antecedents of the “School-To-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between
Race and School Discipline, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 634–38, 662–67 (2011)
(summarizing varying causal explanations for the pipeline and arguing that regression
analysis reveals the causal role of racial bias in school disciplinary decision making);
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1338 n.255 (2011) (listing sources of pipeline data
and analysis).
319
Cf. James J. Heckman, Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in
Disadvantaged Children, SCI., June 30, 2006, at 1900–01 (arguing for skills acquisition as
a priority for disadvantaged children). But see Holzer, supra note 85, at 15–20 (challenging
Heckman’s “nothing works” critique of investing in adult human capital formation and
emphasis on triaging scarce resources by diverting investments to early childhood
development); Alan B. Krueger, Inequality, Too Much of a Good Thing, in JAMES J.
HECKMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN
CAPITAL POLICIES? 1, 24–27, 60–61 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2003) (critiquing
exclusive focus on early intervention).
320
Flavio Cunha et. al., Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 697, 756 (Eric A. Hanushek & Finis Welch
eds., 2006); Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 489–92 (2009) (describing metastudy analyses).
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popular programs like D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) and Scared
Straight appear to have no effect or may even cause harm. 321
Heckman describes successful early intervention as investment in human
capital. Those initiatives are as readily viewed as enhancing individual and
community self-governance. 322 The related empirical data hold promise for a
democracy-enhancing approach to criminal law and procedure. Democracy
enhancement at those levels can reduce the risk of criminal justice involvement
before the mill begins its crushing cycle of offense and victimization, arrest,
charge, conviction, incarceration, reentry, and recidivism. 323
As Professor Heckman explains, “Skill formation is a life cycle process. It
starts in the womb and goes on throughout life. . . . [T]he traditional debate about
nature versus nurture is scientifically obsolete.” 324 When these capacities develop
early on, they simultaneously “raise[] skill attainment at later stages” and
“facilitate[] the productivity of later investment.” 325 The mutually reinforcing
relationship of these capacities frees early investment in human development of
any “equity-efficiency trade-off.” 326
A number of early-intervention programs have been tested over time in terms
of their payoff in reducing the risk of criminal justice involvement. 327 One topperforming example is the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP). 328 The program pairs
a registered nurse with low-income, first-time mothers during pregnancy and for
the first two years of the baby’s life. 329
321

Soler et al., supra note 320, at 491–92.
Cf. Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 433–34 (2006)
(arguing for constitutional recognition that early caregiving is “essential to the
development of those psychological capacities that are necessary to the maintenance and
flourishing of our modern democratic polity”).
323
See Forman, supra note 60, at 52 n.118 (arguing that “the state frequently
squanders opportunities to intervene before adolescents become murderers”). Forman
promotes improved educational opportunities, programs, and services for incarcerated
youth and adults. Id. at n.119.
324
Cunha et al., supra note 320, at 698.
325
Id.
326
Id.
327
Id.; see also Philip J. Cook et al., School Crime Control and Prevention, 39 CRIME
& JUST. 313, 317, 377, 391 (2010) (“[T]his field is burdened by a lack of timely policy
research and a tendency to launch major initiatives without first (or ever!) doing a highquality evaluation.”); Soler, supra note 320, at 489–91 (describing testing methodology and
results of Colorado’s Blueprints for Violence Prevention initiative).
328
Soler, supra note 320, at 490; see also SHARON MIHALIC ET AL., OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BLUEPRINTS
FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION 1–20 (2004) (delineating criteria for selecting effective
programing), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204274.pdf. Other highly
effective model programs that are more resource intensive than the Nurse-Family
Partnerships include Functional Family Therapy, Multisystemic Therapy, and
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care. Id. at 26–28.
329
David L. Olds et al., Taking Preventive Intervention to Scale: Nurse-Family
Partnerships, 10 COGNITIVE & BEH. PRAC. 278, 281–82 (2003). Further research is needed
to determine the extent to which NFP’s commitment to voluntary and mutually respectful
relationships between nurses and mothers prevents the degradation critiqued by Khiara M.
322
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Economists at the RAND Corporation calculated that each dollar invested in
NFP involvement with a high-risk family saves more than five dollars in social
services, health care, and criminal justice expenditures. 330 One might fruitfully
compare the economic impact of early intervention and prevention with the cost of
processing criminal cases—the bulk of which are low-level misdemeanors. 331
Accounting solely for personnel and physical-plant investments, an estimate from
one jurisdiction concluded that flooding courtrooms with these cases is the
criminal justice equivalent of swamping intensive care units with nosebleeds—at a
cost to taxpayers of approximately $40,000 per hour. 332
North Carolina has promoted NFP in association with a twenty-year-old state
legislative initiative called Smart Start.333 Established in 1993, Smart Start is a
multipronged strategy to improve life outcomes by increasing low-income
children’s preparation for kindergarten. “We want to develop their brains. We want
them to start school healthy and ready to learn,” explained then-Governor Jim
Hunt. 334 Because NFP is an evidence-based model, fidelity to program design and
structure is a prerequisite for accreditation. North Carolina was approved to begin
an NFP program in one county in 2000 and has since expanded to 10 of the state’s
100 counties. 335
That rate of expansion belies claims of social scientists that “the public is
nearly universal in its support for early intervention—so much so that ‘child
saving’ can be considered a core cultural belief.”336 Moreover, despite investing in
early empowerment through Smart Start, and despite overall improving test scores,
North Carolina still ranks fourth from the bottom among states for SAT scores. 337
The state also ranks second highest for teenage dropout rates. 338

Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 122 n.27
(2011).
330
Lynn A. Karoly et al., Many Happy Returns: Early Childhood Programs Entail
Costs, but the Paybacks Could Be Substantial, RAND REV., Fall 2005, at 10, 16–17.
331
See generally ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), available at www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/Downloa
dAsset.aspx?id=20808 (arguing that the “explosive growth” of misdemeanor cases results
in underrepresented misdemeanants and high tax costs).
332
ELI BRAUN, OHIO JUSTICE & POL’Y CTR., $42,000 FOR A COURTHOUSE HOUR: THE
COST OF PROCESSING ADULT CRIMINAL CASES IN HAMILTON COUNTY OHIO 6 (2010),
available at http://www.ohiojpc.org/text/publications/court%20cost.pdf.
333
Hunt Back for Smart Start, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2011), http://
www.newsobserver.com/2011/03/22/1071553_hunt-back-for-smart-start.html.
334
Id.
335
M. Tina Markanda, North Carolina Nurse-Family Partnership: Evidence-Based
Nurse Home Visitation Program and Health Care Reform, 71 N.C. MED. J. 302, 302–03
(2010).
336
Frances T. Cullen et al., Public Support for Early Intervention: Is Child Saving a
“Habit of the Heart”? 2 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 109, 111 (2007).
337
Tico A. Almeida, Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children:
Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 525, 528 (2004).
338
Id. at 525, 527–28.
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NFP designer David Olds also notes that the program grew during the
economic boom years of the 1990s. He was prescient in predicting that continued
support would be uncertain in harder times despite the fact that “it is during
periods of economic stagnation and high unemployment that the program of this
kind is needed most.” 339 Smart Start has come under repeated attack in recent
years, including cuts to its $300 million annual state funding. The 2008 economic
crisis also did not spare the foundations that have supported North Carolina’s NFP
programs from the outset. 340
2. Indigent Defense Services
The “basic facts” linking poverty with harm to healthy human development
are “increasingly well known.” 341 So too is the failure of “political will” in the
United States “to invest in programs that work” and address the “moral scandal” of
the highest child poverty rate in the Western industrialized world by bringing those
rates in line with nations averaging “between one eighth and one half” that rate.342
As these policy decisions feed predictable patterns of criminal victimization and
offending, the public defender occupies a unique role in the struggle for expanded
self-governance. This role’s “peculiar sacredness” derives from the duty to give
voice to and vindicate the interests of the disproportionately low-income and
minority individuals who face government prosecution. 343
Despite recent attacks on its independence, North Carolina’s Indigent Defense
Services (IDS) system remains relatively well positioned to fulfill this role. The
state enjoys one of the better-developed public defender programs in the country.
Four components of the state’s Indigent Defense Act have been critical. The first
three fulfilled the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System, widely acknowledged as establishing best practice standards for
structuring indigent defense. 344
First, at the statutes’ inception, their express purpose prioritized quality of
service and independence of counsel.345 Second, that independence was secured
through system governance by a relatively broad-based commission that was not
339

Olds et al., supra note 329, at 288.
See Hunt Back for Smart Start, supra note 333 (describing 2011 budget
negotiations and conservative criticism of Smart Start’s “wasting money” and “overpaid”
leadership).
341
J. Lawrence Aber et al., The Impact of Poverty on the Mental Health and
Development of Very Young Children, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 113, 113
(Charles H. Zeanah, Jr., ed., 2d ed. 2000).
342
Id. at 124–25.
343
See Moore, supra note 151, at 1055–56 & n.126 (quoting Avery v. Alabama, 308
U.S. 444, 447 (1940)).
344
See AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2–
3 (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ai
d_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.
345
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.1 (2011) (stating that the Act’s purpose is to “[e]nhance
oversight” and “[i]mprove the quality . . . and . . . ensure the independence” of defense
representation “in the most efficient and cost-effective manner without sacrificing quality
representation”).
340
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beholden to the executive, legislative, or judicial branches. 346 Third, that
commission was empowered to establish and enforce detailed, statewide standards
for qualification, training, and performance for attorneys in all indigent defense
practice areas ranging from termination of parental rights to death penalty cases. 347
Finally, and perhaps uniquely among jurisdictions in the United States, IDS
has enjoyed relatively robust data collection, assessment, and research
capacities. 348 Reports have tracked per-case costs, identified avenues for improving
efficiency without sacrificing quality of service, and highlighted opportunities to
obtain more effective criminal justice policies. 349 The IDS research division is the
first in the nation to undertake broad-based, empirical examination of best practice
standards for public defender training and performance. 350
IDS also enhances client service through listserv and other web-based training
and communication networks. These resources create communities of knowledge
and support among lawyers in various specialty areas. 351 In addition to offering a
rich intellectual, practical, and emotional resource for practitioners struggling with
demanding caseloads, this communications network reciprocally helps IDS
administrators respond to concerns of lawyers in the trenches.
In terms of more traditional exercises of oppositional politics, the statewide
IDS communications network also keeps the public defense bar alert and
responsive to pending legislative changes—but apparently with diminishing effect.
For example, recent cost-cutting and “tough on crime” legislation requires low-bid
contracting of public defense services, and transferred ultimate responsibility for
evaluating quality of contract service from IDS to elected local judges. 352 The
346

See id. § 7A-498.4.
Id. §§ 7A-498.5 to .6. For the full guidelines, see IDS Standards and Performance
Guidelines, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., http://www.ncids.org/Attorney/
Standards_Guidelines.html?c=Information%20for%20Counsel,%20Standards%20And%20
Performance%20Guidelines (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
348
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.1 (2004) (stating the Act’s purpose includes
“[g]enerat[ing] reliable statistical information in order to evaluate the services provided and
funds expended”).
349
See generally N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., NORTH CAROLINA’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A COMPARISON OF PROSECUTION AND INDIGENT DEFENSE
RESOURCES (2011), available at http://www.ncids.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Latest%20
Releases/ProsecutionOfIndigentDefense.pdf.
350
MARGARET A. GRESSENS & DARRYL V. ATKINSON, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVS., THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT DEFENSE—THE NORTH
CAROLINA SYSTEMS EVALUATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES GUIDE 4–6 (2012),
available at http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/Projects/PM_Guide.
pdf. IDS also appears to be pioneering the role of Forensic Resource Counsel to train and
assist defenders in understanding and challenging forensic science evidence. See supra note
295.
351
About the IDS Commission and the IDS Office, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVS., http://www.ncids.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
352
Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013, 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws 360, §§ 18A.4, available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Sen
ate/PDF/S402v7.pdf (mandating contracts with private counsel who can provide “services
more efficiently than current costs and ensure that the quality of representation is sufficient
to meet applicable constitutional and statutory standards,” with provider selection based
347
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General Assembly also politicized the appointment of regional chief defenders by
transferring that authority from IDS to elected local judges as well. 353
As when prosecutors pushed proposals to weaken the state’s pioneering
criminal discovery reform statutes, 354 there was defense-led opposition to the
amendment of these core IDS provisions. That opposition was ultimately thwarted,
however. The legislature rejected amendments that would have maintained
compliance with the ABA Ten Principles by requiring IDS to ensure that low-bid
contracts provide quality representation and to retain authority over public
defender appointments. 355
3. The Racial Justice Act
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, few of North Carolina’s cuttingedge reforms attack the roots of the concentrated disadvantage and democracy
deficit that mark the intersection of race, crime, and poverty. 356 There are
noteworthy exceptions, however. The president of the North Carolina Conference
of District Attorneys has publicly “highlight[ed] a great social issue that has been
years in the making and is bigger than any of us: race and justice and
disproportionate minority contact with the criminal justice system.” 357 Professors
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright also note that the prosecutor in North Carolina’s
largest city was one of a select few in the nation to participate in an internal selfassessment designed to detect the influence of racial bias, whether implicit or
conscious, in prosecutorial decision making. 358
In addition, Professors Mosteller, Grosso, and O’Brien have highlighted the
state’s innovative Racial Justice Act (RJA). This legislation was the first in the
nation to open meaningful avenues toward relief from capital prosecutions and
solely on “cost-effectiveness” and with “[d]isputes regarding the ability of the potential
contractor to provide effective representation . . . determined by the senior resident superior
court judge for the district”).
353
Id. at § 18A.5(a) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.7(b)).
354
See Moore, supra note 13, at 1341–44.
355
The original bill required IDS to award contracts based solely on efficiency and
cost effectiveness, and transferred authority from IDS to local judges both to resolve issues
about quality and to appoint local public defenders. S.B. 402 §§ 18.A.4 to .5, 2013 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Se
nate/PDF/S402v2.pdf. Defense advocates initially stripped those provisions from the bill.
S.B. 402, §§ 18.A.1–3, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://ww
w.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S402v4.pdf. Two days later, the contracting
requirement was back, but with IDS retaining final contracting authority and required to
consider quality of representation as well as efficiency and cost effectiveness. S.B. 402,
§§ 18.A.4, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/
Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S402v5.pdf. That victory was partial and short lived,
however. See supra notes 352–353.
356
See Pratt & Cullen, supra note 38, at 378–79.
357
Ben David, Community-Based Prosecution in North Carolina: An Inside-Out
Approach to Public Service at the Courthouse, on the Street, and in the Classroom, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 373, 375–76 (2012).
358
Miller & Wright, supra note 80, at 162–63.
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death sentences based on statistical evidence that race was a substantial factor in
discretionary decision making by prosecutors and jurors. 359
As these scholars explain, the RJA moved significantly beyond the limited
constitutional protections against race bias afforded to prospective jurors by Batson
v. Kentucky 360 and to capitally charged defendants under McClesky v. Kemp, 361 in
part by allowing defendants to prove the existence and effect of bias through
statistical evidence. 362 Thus, the RJA also expanded upon the only prior statutory
model from Kentucky. 363 Finally, the RJA was the first law of any kind to result in
judicial findings, in State v. Robinson, 364 that a death penalty system was infected
by the intentional, statewide, race-based discrimination by prosecutors against
African Americans in jury selection. 365
Two months after Robinson, the state legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto
of amendments that gutted key RJA provisions. 366 Nevertheless, the Robinson
findings were reinforced by a second RJA order vacating three more death
sentences under the amended statutes. 367 The presiding judge again found that
prosecutors had discriminated against prospective African American jurors on the
basis of race. 368 Such discrimination, the court held, “is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and representative government.” 369 The court
expressed hope that acknowledging “the ugly truth of race discrimination” in the
selection of capital jurors would help to realize “our ideal of equal justice under the
law.” 370
359
See North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012
(Supp. 2012). For an analysis of the legal and political history that led to the Racial Justice
Act, see Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 193; Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso,
Confronting Race: How a Confluence of Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to
Go Where the McCleskey Court Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 496–98. For
analysis of the statute’s application, see Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey
and Batson: The North Carolina Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory
Challenges in Death Cases, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 116–32 (2012).
360
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
361
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
362
Mosteller, supra note 359, at 107–16; O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 359, at 467–
76.
363
See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 238–44 (2007).
364
State v. Robinson, No. 91-CRS-23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012), available
at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson_order.pdf.
365
Id. at 3, 70-71, 87-88, 95, 108, 160-67.
366
An Act to Amend Death Penalty Procedure, S.B. 416, §§ 2–9, 2011 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (enacted) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A2004(b), 15A-2011 to -2012). But see Mosteller, supra note 359, at 105–06 (describing
amendments as “less sweeping” than vetoed revisions “but [still] quite significant”).
367
State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314–15, 98 CRS 34832, 30544, & 01 CRS
65079, at 2 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja
_order_12-13-12.pdf.
368
Id. at 5.
369
Id. at 6 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
370
Id.; see also id. at 87–91 (discussing history of de jure and de facto exclusion of
African Americans from jury service).
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The RJA rulings constitute historic vindications of participatory democracy at
the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. The rulings are noteworthy for other
reasons as well. The court found, consistent with the first RJA order, that
regression analysis revealed race-based disparate treatment of prospective jurors
by prosecutors to be a significant factor in the imposition of the defendants’ death
sentences. 371 As required by the amended statute, the second RJA order was not
based on statistical evidence alone.
Instead, the second RJA order was “based primarily on the words and deeds
of the prosecutors” constituting “powerful evidence of race consciousness and
race-based decision making.” 372 The prosecution provided what the court found to
be the most compelling evidence of the prosecutors’ own intentional
discrimination.
One prosecutor undercut the State’s case by committing perjury during the
RJA hearing itself. 373 Other prosecutorial “words and deeds” included a “Top
Gun” training program sponsored by the state Conference of District Attorneys,
which promoted strategies to avoid Batson’s already weakly enforceable strictures
against race-based peremptory strikes. 374 Prosecutors also offered what the trial
court found to be “patently irrational, nonsensical” justifications for striking
African Americans from venires. These included prospective jurors’ military
service, affiliation with the state government, and church attendance. 375
Yet another set of prosecutorial “words and deeds” brings this discussion full
circle by linking the RJA litigation with North Carolina’s prior pioneering reform
of full open-file discovery. These “words and deeds” comprised prosecutors’ notes,
which documented the consideration of race in the exercise of jury strikes against
African Americans. The notes were “long buried in the case files and brought to
light for the first time” at the RJA hearing. 376 They were not “brought to light”
because prosecutors complied with the court’s RJA discovery order, which
required the information’s disclosure to the defense. Instead, the information had
been identified and preserved through a prior, independent defense investigation
made possible by mandatory, statewide full open-file discovery statutes. 377
The RJA rulings are hardly the end of this particular democracy-enhancement
story. They came at a cost to murder victims’ survivors who saw execution as just
punishment despite the race-based elimination of prospective jurors. 378 In April
371

Id. at 136–201.
Id. at 3, 112–20.
373
Id. at 80.
374
Id. at 4–5, 73–77.
375
Id. at 121–24.
376
Id. at 3; see also id. at 50 n.5 (stating that disappearance of prosecutor’s notes from
file “could easily be construed to support the inference that the State intentionally
destroyed [them]” but declining to so find due to sworn testimony by local judges
regarding the prosecutor’s “excellent reputation for truthfulness and integrity”).
377
See id. at 47, 50 & n.5 (discussing 2006 investigation of postconviction counsel);
State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314–15, 98 CRS 34832, 30544, & 01 CRS 65079, at 60–
66 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Hearing Tp. Oct. 1, 2012) (discussing 2006 postconviction discovery
procedure).
378
See Angela Wright, Emotional Response to RJA Verdicts, CIVITAS REV. ONLINE
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.civitasreview.com/miscellaneous/emotional-response-to-rja-ve
372
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and October, 2013, respectively, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted the
State’s petitions for discretionary review of the orders vacating the death sentences
under the RJA. 379 In June 2013, the RJA was repealed entirely and retroactively, 380
with the aim of speeding up state-sanctioned executions. 381
D. Constellation Mapping and Circumspection
To map the foregoing constellation of laws and policies in North Carolina is
to reveal cycles of reform, reaction, retrenchment, and repeal that warrant
considerable circumspection. Other states may achieve similar or better outcomes
through other means. North Carolina also has failed to fully exploit all available
reform opportunities. A salient example relates to the nationally publicized
decision of Governor Beverly Perdue to issue pardons of innocence for a group of
civil rights and antipoverty activists known as “The Wilmington Ten.” 382
Perdue issued the pardons just before leaving office in January 2013, but the
cases arose forty years earlier. The defendants were convicted of firebombing a
white-owned grocery store in North Carolina’s largest port city—the site of the
infamous Wilmington Massacre during the white supremacy campaign of the
1890s. 383 The grocery store fire occurred amid protests over the closure of the local
African American high school and dispersal of the black students to white
schools. 384
The cases of the Wilmington Ten, like other cases that ultimately motivated
North Carolina’s enactment of mandatory statewide full open-file criminal
discovery, 385 involved years of postconviction litigation and a federal appellate
court vacating the convictions based on Brady violations. 386 The Fourth Circuit
reached the “inescapable” conclusion that the Wilmington Ten prosecutor knew his
key witness committed perjury and suppressed the witness’s contradictory prior
statement from the defense (along with other material exculpatory evidence).387
Yet the taint of prior conviction and imprisonment still hung over the
Wilmington Ten until Perdue issued the pardons of innocence. The governor’s
signing statement cited the recantation of prior witnesses as a reason for issuing the
rdicts/ (describing the departure from the courtroom of the widow of murdered highway
patrol Sergeant Ed Lowry and uniformed officers, who had filled “over three-fourths of the
courtroom,” as the judge read the order entitling the defendants to reduced sentences).
379
State v. Augustine, 748 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. 2013); State v. Robinson, 366 N.C. 558
(2013). The author filed Brief for North Carolina Citizens Excluded From Jury Service
Based on Race as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Robinson, 366 N.C. 558
(No. 411A94-5).
380
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 154, § 5(a)–(d).
381
Id. §§ 1–4.
382
See, e.g., Valerie Bauerlein, Full Pardon in ‘Wilmington 10’ Case, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 1, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873233204045782
16040822458954.html (subscription required).
383
See supra Part III.B.
384
Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 215–16 (4th Cir. 1980).
385
See Moore, supra note 13, at 1377–79.
386
Chavis, 637 F.2d at 223–24.
387
Id.
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pardons. But the signing statement also emphasized newly discovered evidence
that the prosecutor relied on race in jury selection. 388
The governor decried the latter conduct as
utterly incompatible with basic notions of fairness and with every ideal
that North Carolina holds dear. The legitimacy of our criminal justice
system hinges on it operating in a fair and equitable manner . . . not
based on race or other forms of prejudice. . . . [T]hese convictions were
tainted by naked racism and represent an ugly stain on North Carolina’s
criminal justice system that cannot be allowed to stand any longer. 389
Perdue was not alone in condemning the infection of criminal proceedings
with racially biased juror exclusion. She was joined by Wilmington’s prosecutor—
the same man who, as president-elect of the state Conference of District Attorneys,
publicly called for innovative responses to “a great social issue that has been years
in the making and is bigger than any of us: race and justice.” 390 The prosecutor was
quoted as saying,
When jurors are excluded from the judicial process on the basis of
race . . . the defendant and the entire community are denied a fair
trial. . . . Where, as here, the process that was in place to search for the
truth is determined to be so fundamentally flawed that we cannot know
it, the verdict cannot stand the test of time. 391
Such statements might have inspired hope that the RJA orders finding
statewide infection of capital jury selection with comparable race bias would
inspire gubernatorial disapprobation and even conversion of existing death
sentences to RJA-mandated sentences of life imprisonment without parole. At
minimum, such sentiments might have been expected to stem the tide toward the
RJA’s repeal. Future research should explore the reasons why such aspirations
were so completely thwarted. Some preliminary thoughts are offered here.
First, the cases of the Wilmington Ten and the RJA litigants stood in a very
different procedural posture. For the former, forty years of litigation and
extrajudicial advocacy revealed the unfairness under settled federal constitutional
law, and the factual wrongfulness, of the convictions and sentences. In contrast,
when the governor issued the Wilmington Ten pardons, the ink was barely dry on
the RJA amendments, orders, and petitions for appellate review—none of which
388

The local newspaper published the full text of the governor’s signing statement,
which was deleted from the gubernatorial website after Perdue left office. See Special to
the Wilmington Journal from the Governor of the State of North Carolina, Governor
Beverly Perdue, WILMINGTON J. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://wilmingtonjournal.com/gov-perdue-i
ssues-pardon-of-innocence-for-wilmington-10/.
389
Id.
390
David, supra note 357, at 375–76.
391
Anne Blythe, Perdue Pardons Wilmington 10, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Jan. 1,
2013), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12/31/3758600/perdue-pardons-wilmington
-10.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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implicated any of the innocentric interests that garner (relatively) ready popular
support.
Second, as the foregoing analysis of North Carolina’s criminal justice reforms
demonstrates, change is seldom insulated from reaction and repeal. It was precisely
the effectiveness of the RJA’s direct, systemic assault on the infection of race bias
in capital cases that proved to be the statute’s undoing. Other categorical
interventions to halt executions have had mixed long-term results, including
backlash against judicial, executive, and legislative decision makers and increased
support for capital punishment. 392 Put bluntly, the RJA jumped on the political
third rail at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty.
The foregoing analysis also makes clear that while several of North Carolina’s
pioneering reforms resulted from litigation and legislation, none exemplifies direct
input or leadership from the low-income and minority individuals who are
disproportionately affected by crime and criminal justice systems. Certainly these
reforms appear to level the playing field. One or two could be cast as
fundamentally concerned with democracy enhancement. But with the exception of
the Innocence Inquiry Commission and the RJA, support has been deeply rooted in
arguments for efficiency—the wise stewardship of increasingly scarce tax dollars.
One need not share Derrick Bell’s suspicion toward interest convergence, Matthew
Adler’s critique of cost-benefit analysis, or Iris Marion Young’s commitment to
democracy as fully participatory communicative action to seek a more sustainable
theoretical grounding for criminal justice reform.
Viewed through the lens of a democracy-enhancement theory discussed in
Part II, therefore, North Carolina’s reforms present a decidedly mixed picture. The
next Part digs below the surface to examine the state’s institutional culture in light
of the outlines of a democracy-enhancement theory, probing for causal
explanations behind the constellation of cutting-edge criminal justice reforms and
their occasional resilience against reaction and repeal. To that end, Part V focuses
particularly on the institutionalization of capacities for critical reflection and action
through oppositional politics.
V. DEMOS, DELIBERATORS, AND DEFENDERS
Mixed motives sparked North Carolina’s constellation of cutting-edge
criminal justice reforms. Initiatives driven by concerns for fairness or involving
significant resource redistribution—whether that redistribution targets economic,
human, or social capital, including the prerogatives of white privilege—have been
less resilient in the face of reaction and repeal than those with more immediately
obvious cost-benefit payoffs. The search in this Part is for replicable conditions
that promote sustainable reform, particularly conditions that enable jurisdictions to
embed self-reflective capacities within processes for criminal justice policy
making and implementation.
392

See, e.g., Kelly Holthusen, How to Argue for Your Life in Fifteen Minutes or Less:
An Analysis of Illinois Governor Ryan’s Clemency Review Boards, 30 NEW ENG. J. CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 105, 122–23 (2004) (discussing response to gubernatorial decisions);
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 574–77 (2009)
(discussing response to U.S. Supreme Court rulings).
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A. Demos
The historian V.O. Key, Jr. correctly noted that North Carolina’s then-nascent
oppositional politics had the potential to grow from the ground up. 393 The state’s
geography is trifurcated between the Appalachian Mountains, the Piedmont, and
the sea. In parallel fashion, economic interests were historically divided among a
relatively small slave-owning plantation elite in the east, small farmers in the
center of the state, and a historically poorer and more isolated mountain
population. As discussed in Part III, the post-Reconstruction white supremacy
campaigns, the violent imposition of one-party rule, and Jim Crow repression
coincided with concentrating power in the tobacco and textile manufacturing
industries, rapidly expanding banking interests, and the development of a small
group of highly influential law firms. In Key’s description, from North Carolina’s
inception, the state’s regional economic interests created “more-tender sectional
sensibilities than any other state in the South . . . . ” 394
But most states can claim geographic, economic and political divisions that
will be viewed as significant by the people who have to navigate them. Likewise,
opposition between conservative, business-oriented factions and populist
undercurrents is commonplace. A number of states also have greater racial and
ethnic diversity than North Carolina. A recent spike in Latino immigration has
reduced the non-Hispanic white population to 65% while the black population has
remained fairly consistent at just under 25% of the population. 395
Nevertheless, both before and after the Red Shirt revolution, the African
American population in North Carolina enjoyed strong, well-educated, businessoriented, politically active leadership.396 During the Jim Crow era, blacks
developed independent institutional structures in addition to business and
schools—“churches, newspapers, fraternal lodges, and women’s clubs”—and
hammered out new coalitions with partners inside and outside the state.397 Those
resources provided a foundation for oppositional politics in the most recent Civil
Rights era and beyond. Exemplary leaders include nationally renowned historian
John Hope Franklin as well as leading civil rights attorneys such as Julius L.
Chambers and James E. Ferguson II. 398 As Professors O’Brien and Grosso explain,
393

See KEY, supra note 177, at 218–28.
Id. at 219.
395
See KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 311; State and County QuickFacts:
North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last revised Mar. 27, 2014), http://quickfacts.censu
s.gov/qfd/states/37000.html.
396
See, e.g., KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 81, 189–90 (discussing black
leadership in Durham).
397
ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 187–88 (1984).
398
Patricia Sullivan, Southern Reformers, the New Deal, and the Movement’s
Foundation, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 241, at 89 & n.19 (discussing John Hope
Franklin); Douglas Martin, Julius Chambers, a Fighter for Civil Rights, Dies at 76, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/julius-chambers-a-fighter-fo
r-civil-rights-dies-at-76.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing Chambers’s leadership);
see also Charles E. Daye, The Evolution of the Modern Law School: Crucial Trends That
Bridge Past and Future, 73 N.C. L. REV. 675, 685 (1995) (describing Chambers’s role as a
394
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such leadership energized similar coalition building that led to the near success of
a legislative moratorium on executions and, in turn, to passage of the RJA. 399
B. Deliberators
Despite the state’s halting progress on education, there is at least one
distinctive example of an “honest broker” deliberative function served by a public
university in the context of criminal law and procedure. Professors at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s School of Government evaluate and
interpret legislation and case law as part of their duties in training prosecutors,
judges, and indigent defense attorneys from all corners of the state’s unified court
system. Because institutions and individual actors are mutually constitutive,400
leadership development is critical. Critiques of criminal justice systems, agencies,
and agents often emphasize the powerful impact of institutional culture on
stakeholders’ identity formation, including through the shaping of next-generation
leadership (whether intentional or unintentional). 401 It appears that relatively few
states have similar evaluation, interpretation, training and research functions that
are embedded in their local universities and focused on criminal law and
procedure. 402
Foundations and nonprofits also provide some institutionally independent
space to improve the quality of deliberation and decision making on issues of
criminal law and procedure. As discussed in Part IV.A, Key and other scholars
overstate the scope and direction of North Carolina’s progress on education. 403
There is bitter irony in the fact that one of the state’s leading white supremacists
simultaneously oversaw the violent overthrow of elected Fusionist governments,
the development of Jim Crow, and the biggest investment in the state’s history to
improve public education for both black and white students. Significantly, it was
investments from northern foundations that supported the white supremacist
movement’s “school-building campaign of staggering proportions: during the
period 1902–10, the state erected on average more than one new schoolhouse a
day.” 404
civil rights leader and litigator of key cases in both school desegregation and employment
discrimination); Lawyer Limelight: James E. Ferguson II, LAWDRAGON (Jan. 5, 2012)
(interview with James Ferguson describing his civil rights advocacy), available at http://
www.lawdragon.com/lawyer-limelights/james-e-ferguson-ii/.
399
O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 359, at 495–98.
400
See Elizabeth S. Clemens & James M. Cook, Politics and Institutionalism:
Explaining Durability and Change, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 441, 445−46 (1999).
401
See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 80, at 184−87.
402
One corollary to North Carolina’s School of Government is the Washington State
Institute for Public Policy. See generally STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POL’Y, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON
CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES (2006).
403
See KEY, supra note 177, at 208–09 (emphasizing educational advances under
white supremacist rule). But see supra notes 222, 262 and accompanying text.
404
At the same time, per-pupil funding for black and white students dropped from
parity to thirty cents on the dollar. KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 59; see also J.
Morgan Kousser, Progressivism—For Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina
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Foundations and nonprofits also help expand opportunities and capacities for
oppositional politics at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. Like other
states, North Carolina has a long history of such public-private partnerships. In the
antebellum, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow eras, black leaders tapped northern
philanthropists and mission societies to build educational and business
infrastructure. 405 As noted above, a white supremacist governor used foundation
funds to support a school-building campaign in the first part of the twentieth
century. In the early 1960s, then-Governor Terry Sanford obtained funding from
the Ford Foundation, as well as North Carolina’s Z. Smith Reynolds and Mary
Reynolds Babcock foundations, for a homegrown War on Poverty. 406 The resulting
North Carolina Fund became a model for the federal War on Poverty, particularly
in emphasizing maximum feasible participation by low-income and minority
individuals and communities in program development, implementation, and
oversight. 407
As discussed in Part III, the Fund saw limited success, but African American
leadership (both grassroots and elite) was critical to the Fund’s creation and
accomplishments. 408 Local philanthropists have continued to support research on
the concentrated disadvantage that exists at the intersection of crime, race, and
poverty. For example, the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation recently provided
support to the School of Government to create the state’s pioneering websearchable collateral consequences database.409 In the wake of negative reaction by
prosecutors and the public to litigation under the RJA, the Fund also supports the
development of training materials for justice system personnel on detecting and
eliminating racial bias from criminal proceedings.410
C. Defenders
Such training may be one of the most important factors in achieving reform
that is sustainable over the long term. This is particularly true when training is
directed through a statewide indigent defense services system 411 that is bolstered
by collaboration between the criminal defense and plaintiffs’ bars to obtain

Education, 1880–1910, 46 J.S. HIST. 169, 189−90 (1980) (contesting the definition of
“progress” in early twentieth-century educational funding, saying that “[i]ncreasing
inequality in services . . . inevitably spawned increasing inequality in income and wealth—
a peculiar definition of progress”).
405
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 59.
406
Aidan Smith, This Month in North Carolina History: July 1963—The North
Carolina Fund, UNIV. OF N.C. (July 2005), http://www2.lib.unc.edu/ncc/ref/nchistory/jul20
05/.
407
KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 59–66, 79–82.
408
See id. at 81–82.
409
See The Collateral Consequences Assessment Tool (C-CAT), UNIV. OF N.C. SCH.
OF GOV’T, http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/2582 (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
410
Alyson Grine, Race Manual Underway, N.C. PUB. DEFENDER (Univ. of N.C. Sch.
of Gov’t, Chapel Hill, N.C.), Aug. 2012, at 3.
411
See supra Part IV.C.2.
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adequate resources and drive policy change. 412 Other free-standing, defenseoriented institutions such as the Center for Death Penalty Litigation also make
major contributions to strengthening oppositional politics in the context of criminal
law and procedure. 413
It is perhaps this combination of factors that distinguishes North Carolina
from other jurisdictions. To be sure, other jurisdictions have unified defender
systems, 414 excellent defender training programs, 415 and partnerships between the
criminal defense and plaintiffs’ bars. 416 But North Carolina appears to be a fairly
rare example where these factors coincide.
As noted in Part IV.C.2, other crucial components of effective indigent
defense reform include the capacities to establish and enforce statewide standards
for attorney qualification, performance, and workload; create and maintain
statewide training and listserv programs that empower attorneys to meet those
standards and demand the resources necessary to do so; and collect, assess, and use
statewide data on outcomes in promoting system improvements. Access to data is
enhanced where, as in North Carolina, the state has merged case processing into a
statewide, unified court system. Although far from comprehensive, such data
collection and assessment capacities are prerequisites to politically effective action
based on fairness, transparency, accountability, and efficiency. 417
At the back end, statutes permit self-correction of indigent defense service
failures by allowing investigation and litigation of postconviction motions
involving ineffective assistance on direct appeal instead of being limited to local
trial courts. 418 North Carolina also has benefited from pockets of strong
investigative reporting by major media outlets. Detailed analysis of wrongful
convictions has played an especially critical role in expanding public awareness of
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subsequent litigation of other constitutional claims post appeal, since 1977).

608

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

and receptivity to broader concerns about fairness and accountability in criminal
proceedings. 419
D. Diversity and Deep Analogies
The foregoing discussion does not exhaust prerequisites for creating and
sustaining oppositional politics in the context of criminal law and procedure. Nor
are the highlighted institutional factors idiosyncratic to any single jurisdiction.
Moreover, any circumstance that supports oppositional politics in the context of
criminal law and procedure must be augmented with vision, opportunism, and
tenacity. There also must be cracks in the mortar that open up wiggle room for
“political entrepreneurs.” 420 Another characteristic that helps to drive and sustain
reform is diversity within institutions, as well as the embedding of institutions
themselves in broader “networks that crosscut important . . . boundaries.” 421
Professors O’Brien and Grosso describe how networking across diversity occurred
in movements leading to enactment of the RJA. 422
Successful articulation and implementation of new policies also may require
“deep analogies to already institutionalized models or widely held norms.” 423 On
this point, North Carolina’s strikingly Janus-faced sociopolitical and legal histories
serve as unlikely resources for the long-haul work of expanding democracy at the
intersection of crime, race, and poverty. It may be that the state’s progressive selfconception—a mythos inscribed in scholarship as early as Key’s Southern
Politics—is itself an important catalyst. That mythology may moderate reaction
and lower the activation energy required to initiate change.
The state’s progressive sociopolitical subtext is discernible even in recent
events. The May 2012 Klan rally outside Harmony, North Carolina, may have
drawn more protesters than participants. 424 In response to the pardon of the
Wilmington Ten, due in part to the past prosecutor’s race-based discrimination
during jury selection, the current prosecutor stated publicly that such conduct
denies both defendants and the community a fair trial. 425 In addition, “Moral
Monday” protests against the recent conservative legislative agenda have drawn
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national attention, particularly as law professors and pastors join the hundreds of
protesters who have been arrested. 426
These recent events reveal deep analogies to historic tensions between the
state’s conservative and progressive movements. Innovation and stability are (often
unhappily) wedded. That dialectical tension supports a cautious optimism about
the degree to which institutional improvements, particularly those obtained through
law, can equalize power disparities without co-opting “subordinate groups through
symbolic displays leaving elite wealth, status, and power in society intact.” 427
The predictable cycle of action and reaction also grounds a healthy skepticism
about the pace if not the overall trajectory of change. Since “mobilization from
below begets counter-mobilization from above,” 428 policy innovators must be
prepared to augment regulation through litigation or legislation with sustained
grassroots advocacy. Sometimes “technically savvy and ideologically committed
representatives of the have-nots” must pull a laboring oar to navigate inevitable
backlash. 429
In other words, it is not time to abandon ship. Litigation, legislation, and
activism remain viable avenues toward improving lives and systems. Despite
predictable reaction and setbacks, the unlikely constellation of pioneering criminal
justice reforms in a single jurisdiction should inspire reform advocates to focus and
renew their efforts.
CONCLUSION
The core question animating this work is a search for sustainable production
of the conditions that allow jurisdictions to reduce the footprint of the carceral state
and improve criminal justice systems through the traditional clash of law and
politics as vitally necessary complements to internal agency reform. The analysis
revealed several interesting characteristics of one reform jurisdiction. Vibrant
oppositional politics incorporate relatively robust and proactive indigent defense
functions. Diverse mechanisms institutionalize the collection, assessment, and
strategic use of criminal justice data. Networking within and across institutions
deepens capacities for effective action.
Such conditions embed greater opportunities for meaningful self-reflection
into discourse on criminal justice issues than can exist in jurisdictions lacking
those capacities. Concededly, where such conditions promote opportunities for
criminal justice reform, they tend to privilege grasstops over grassroots advocacy
and might be dismissed—like Inhofe’s Pilot’s Bill of Rights—as still more
426
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superfluous examples of “them as has, gets.” Nor are these movements immune
from predictable backlash. Nevertheless, engaged scholarship may enhance
attempts to wrest greater transparency and accountability from concentrated
government power—including attempts like Inhofe’s—by expanding avenues
toward broader democratic and productive demands for reform.
One focus for such additional research is analysis of effective activism by
those most directly affected by crime and criminal justice systems—poor people
and people of color. Some justice advocates suggest that defendants and defenders
“crash the system”—that is, collectively monkeywrench the machinery by refusing
plea offers and insisting on taking cases to trial. 430 Other scholars have noted the
work of organizations such as All of Us or None and Families Against Mandatory
Minimums. 431 But legal scholars have yet to assess the democracy-enhancing
potential, strategies, or influence of other solo and small-organization efforts such
as Silicon Valley Debug, which trains families and communities in strategies to
improve case outcomes. 432 Innovative peace-making movements such as
CeaseFire 433 and the Violence Interrupters also hold promise for scholarly
investigation, 434 as does the grassroots activism of exonerated prisoners like John
Thompson.
Interdisciplinary action research opportunities also can focus on democracy
enhancement through leadership development. 435 Readily available avenues
include court-watch and data-collection programs. In the specific context of
indigent defense reform, Know Your Rights cards and consumer satisfaction
surveys can develop experienced consumer-activist leadership to help redress the
“Public Pretender” conundrum that besets service providers. In the same vein,
community-based mediation diversion alternatives empower individuals and
neighborhoods with problem-solving and violence-prevention strategies.
Through these and other practical applications, scholars and practitioners can
concretize a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure that
empowers the low-income and minority individuals who are most directly and
disproportionately affected by the causes and consequences of crime to ask their
own policy questions, build their own coalitions, and advocate for their own
430
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solutions. These are the crucial voices without which meaningful and sustainable
criminal justice reform will remain elusive. They are the source of dangerous
hope—dangerous because it is more often than not likely to be disappointed,436 and
because when linked with vision, opportunism, and tenacity, it can at least
occasionally level power disparities instead of ameliorating, reproducing, or
augmenting them.
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